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THE ROLE OF FAULT AND MOTIVE IN
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION: THE
SENIORITY QUESTION UNDER TITLE
VII
MARK S. BRODINt
Seniority systems play an important role in American industry,
often governing rights to promotion, pay scales, layoff, and relative enti-
tlement to ancillary benefits. Seniority based decisionmaking protects
employees from arbitrary employer action, yet seniority's same protec-
tive feature often may frustrate minorities' efforts to achieve actual
equal employment opportunity Relying on Title Vii's section 703(h),
the Supreme Court has held that seniority systems are immune from
attack unless discriminatory intent is shown. In this Article, Professor
Brodin reviews the evolution of the intent standard now governing sen-
iority system challeges. He contrasts the Supreme Court's restrictive
defnition of intent in the seniority system context with the concept of
intentfound in other sections of Title VII, and in tort and criminal law.
He argues that the Court's restrictive defnition of intent is neither con-
sistent with the legal system's approach to other conduct with socially
injurious effects, norfacilitative of thepolicies represented by Title VII.
Eleven years after the end of the American Civil War the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Cruikshank,1 involving the criminal prosecution of a
group of white men charged with conspiracy to deny blacks the free exercise of
their constitutional rights. The blacks had assembled in their town of Colfax,
Louisiana to protest the results of a local election. In what came to be known
as the Colfax Massacre, the white group set fire to the building in which the
blacks were gathered and shot them as they attempted to escape. In reversing
the convictions of the defendants, the Supreme Court held that the indictments
were defective because they failed to allege an essential element of the crime,
specific intent to deprive the victims of constitutional rights "because of" their
race and color.2 Apparently, neither the facts surrounding the particular
white-on-black confrontation, nor the tragic results of the defendants' riotous
actions, nor even the historical setting of racial violence in the South were
t Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Associate Professor of Law, New
England School of Law. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia University. Copyright © 1984 by Mark
S. Brodin.
1. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). This decision is discussed in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERI-
CAN LAW § 5.3, at 210-12 (2d ed. 1980); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 74-75 (1976). While 96 men
were indicted, only nine were actually arrested and charged. The indictments were secured by the
Department of Justice under section six of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 241 (1982)), providing for imprisonment or fine for conspiracy "to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or employment of any right or privelege
secured ... by the Constitution or laws of the U.S."
2. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554, 559.
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sufficient to satisfy the Court's insistence that the perpetrators' discriminatory
intent be alleged and proved. 3
This Article focuses on a contemporary version of the doctrine of specific
intent, and explores its application in a different civil rights context, namely in
litigation challenging seniority systems and seniority based layoffs brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Since 1971, the Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit employment practices that are dis-
criminatory in their effect even if such result is unintended and the employer
acted with no design to discriminate.5 The Court has, however, read Section
703(h) 6 of Title VII to insulate from challenge any "bona fide seniority sys-
tem," no matter how adverse its impact on groups protected by the Act, unless
the challengers prove that the system is a manifestation of the employer's or
union's discriminatory intent, defined as actual motive and purpose.7
Seniority-based decisionmaking threatens to reverse the gains made by
minorities and women over the last two decades. The most dramatic illustra-
tion of this is the almost universal operation of last hired-first fired layoff prac-
tices. Minorities and females, previously excluded from many employment
opportunities and only recently accepted into these jobs, find themselves the
first laid off (because of their low seniority) in times of economic decline.8
3. It appears that the case law still requires, for conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242
(1982), that the defendant be shown to have had the specific purpose of depriving the victim of a
federal right. Such intent can, however, be inferred from the circumstances. See United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966) (indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1982)); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945) (indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982)); Eisenberg, Reflectionson
a Unfled Theory of Motive, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1147, 1150 n.13 (1978).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Title VII prohibits employers
and unions from engaging in discriminatory employment practices on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. The Act's general prohibitory language is broad, reaching prac-
tices which "in any way ... would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976) (employer practices); see
also id. § 2000e-2(c)(2) (labor organization practices).
5. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed infra notes 52-67 and
accompanying text.
6. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or dif-
ferent terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
7. See infra notes 78-120 and accompanying text. The Court has recently applied a similar
intent standard to seniority challenges brought under Title VI of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d to
2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) as well, see infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text, even
though Title VI contains no counterpart to section 703(h).
8. The statistical impact of actual and potential last hired-first fired layoffs is suggested in
W. MURPHY, J. GETMAN & J. JONES, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 168-70 (4th ed. 1979);
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 22-
27 (February 1977); Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy. The Layoff Problen, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177, 178-79 (1975); Note, Alternatives to Seniority Based Layoffs.- Reconciling
Teamsters, Weber, andthe Goal of EqualEmployment Opportunity, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523, 523
& n.1 (1982). To take the example of the Boston police and fire departments, which did not hire
minorities (other than in isolated instances) until they were ordered to do so by courts in the early
1970s, seniority-based layoffs in 1981 threatened to cut in half the substantial gains made in mi-
nority employment. See infra note 142.
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Prevailing Supreme Court doctrine would preclude a successful systemic chal-
lenge to this practice unless plaintiffs have persuasive evidence that the senior-
ity system is being operated in order to discriminate against them, and not
merely with that effect. Thus, most seniority systems'are permitted to perpetu-
ate the effects of past discrimination into the present and the future.9
Focusing on the motives of the employer and union rather than on the
adverse effects of their practices accords with a recent trend in Burger Court
thinking. A majority of the justices now seem to view discrimination not as a
class based phenomenon with societal causes, but as series of discrete, aberrant
acts by individuals harboring personal hostility toward the victim. Elimination
of discrimination requires, from this perspective, not so much social engineer-
ing as restraint of the blameworthy offenders.' 0
This Article critiques the adoption of a fault-premised, motive-centered
standard for determining the legality of seniority systems and layoff schemes.
It begins by tracing the genesis of the specific intent requirement in the lan-
guage and legislative history of Title VII and then follows the Supreme
Court's developing interpretation of the Act as it bears upon seniority systems.
A comparison of the intent defined in this connection and its analogues in tort
and criminal law are explored. The Article next surveys the lower courts' ap-
plication of the motive standard to seniority challenges. The final section dis-
cusses the policy implications of the intent requirement in these Title VII
actions.
I. TITLE VII AND SENIORITY SYSTEMS-THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INTENT REQUIREMENT
Title VII, designed by Congress to eradicate racial discrimination from
the American workplace,' defined discrimination broadly, making unlawful
any conduct by an employer or union "which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities."' 12 The Supreme Court gener-
9. As Dean Derek Bell has observed:
We have witnessed hard-won decisions, intended to protect basic rights of black
citizens from racial discrimination, lose their vitality before they could be enforced effec-
tively. In a nation dedicated to individual freedom, laws that never should have been
needed face neglect, reversal, and outright repeal, while the discrimination they were
designed to eliminate continues in the same or more sophisticated form. In many re-
spects, the civil rights cases and laws of the 1950s and 1960s are facing a fate quite
similar to civil rights measures fashioned to protect the rights of blacks during an earlier
racial reconstruction period more than a century ago.
D. BELL, supra note 1, at xxiii.
10. See Freeman, Legitimizing Race Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2401 (the purpose was "to eliminate ... discrimination in employment
based on race, color, religion, or national origin").
12. Section 703 provides in part that:
(a) Employer practices: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
1984]
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ally has interpreted this statute to prohibit employment practices that are dis-
criminatory in effect and are not compelled by business necessity, even if they
are not specifically intended to discriminate.13 Yet relying on section 703(h),t 4
an ambiguous provision of Title VII that singles out seniority systems for spe-
cial treatment, the Court repeatedly has held that seniority systems with dis-
criminatory effects are not unlawful unless they are the product of a proven
intent to discriminate. 15 There must be, therefore, "a finding of actual intent
to discriminate on racial grounds on the part of those who negotiated or main-
tained the system," with "discriminatory intent here mean[ing] actual mo-
tive";' 6 otherwise the system is immune from challenge regardless of its
adverse impact on minorities. This section of the Article summarizes the
evolution of this specific intent requirement.
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
(c) Labor organization practices: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a la-
bor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or applicants for membership, or
to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or
would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;. . ..
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2(c) (1976).
13. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
15. See infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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4. Section 703(h)-Language and Legislative History17
The original version of Title VII ts made no explicit reference to seniority
systems. This led several members of Congress to express concern that the
statute would invalidate such systems either by requiring that employers
achieve a racially balanced workplace notwithstanding seniority arrange-
ments, or by compelling employers who had previously excluded blacks to
revise their seniority systems when blacks were hired.' 9 Proponents of the bill
denied that it would have this effect.20 Senators Clark and Case, leaders in the
fight for enactment of Title VII, submitted an interpretative memorandum
(prepared by the Justice Department at their request) which asserted that the
bill as then drafted was prospective only, would not affect established seniority
rights, and would not require revision of seniority practices to accommodate
for past discrimination. 21 Another statement of the Justice Department which
17. Title VII, § 703(h) has an "unusual legislative history" which is characterized by "the
absence of the usual legislative materials." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761
(1976). The situation resulted from the turmoil following the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy and the strong desire of Lyndon Johnson and others to promptly enact a civil rights law.
See generally Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966). The
original version of the statute adopted by the House generated a report by the Judiciary
Committee. But the Act that finally was adopted was a significantly modified substitute bill
adopted by the Senate, and it did not go through committee procedure. Thus:
Unfortunately the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is recorded not so
much in Committee Reports as in the pages of the Congressional Record in which are
recorded the debates and arguments of both opponents and proponents ....
Admittedly this is not the kind of legislative history on which courts are accustomed to
rely.
Id. at 457-58.
The legislative history of § 703(h) has been the subject of much scholarly and judicial atten-
tion. See generally W. MURPHY, J. GETMAN & J. JONES, supra note 8, at 168; Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1607-15 (1969); Poplin, supra note 8, at 187-88;
Rachlin, Title VII Limitations and Qualifications, 1965 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 473; Note,
Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544, 1548 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Last Hired]; Note, Title VII v. Seniority: Ensuring Rights or Denying Rights?, 26
How. L.J. 1487 (1983); Note, supra note 8, at 526. See also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
102 S. Ct. 1534, 1538-41 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
342-55 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
18. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-15 (1963).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, 65-66, 71 (1963) (minority report), re-
printed in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2431, 2433, 2439-40; 110 CONG. REC. 486-88
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill); id. at 2726 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id. at 7091 (remarks of Sen.
Stennis).
20. See 110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 6549 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey); id. at 6564 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
21. 110 CONG. REC. 7212-15 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152
submitted jointly by Sen. Joesph S. Clark and Sen. Clifford P. Case, floor managers). The memo-
randum explained:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospec-
tive and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in
the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to
hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. (How-
ever, where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the effective date of the
1984]
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was placed in the record explicitly asserted that the bill would not prohibit
layoffs in reverse seniority order, "even in the case where owing to discrimina-
tion prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority
than Negroes."'22 A set of answers to questions raised by Senator Dirksen
provided the same assurance that differences in the treatment of employees
based on seniority, including a last hired-first fired layoff practice, would not
violate the Act.23
Nevertheless, attempts were made in both Houses to write into the Act an
explicit protection for seniority systems. Representative Dowdy proposed lan-
guage which would have exempted completely "employment practices [that]
are pursuant to . . . a seniority system."'24 This amendment was defeated
without debate.25 Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, and Humphrey later offered
an amendment 26 to the substitute bill (which was enacted as Title VII) that
was approved unchanged and became section 703(h) of the Act.2 7 This section
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be
title, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after the title takes effect
may be held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish discrimination.).
Id. at 7213.
22. Id. at 7207. The report further stated that:
Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promo-
tion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he is
not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the seniority rule itself
is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under Title VII. If a rule were to state that all
Negroes must be lid off before any white man, such a rule could not serve as the basis
for a discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title. I do not know how anyone
could quarrel with such a result. But, in the ordinary case, assuming that seniority rights
were built up over a period of time during which Negroes were not hired, these rights
would not be set aside by the taking effect of Title VII. Employers and labor organiza-
tions would simply be under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because of their
race. Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights would not be
based on race and would not be forbidden by the title.
Id.
23. Id. at 7216-17 (response to Dirksen Memorandum). A portion of this response provided
that:
Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when that man-
agement function is governed by a labor contract calling for promotions on the basis of
seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor contracts call for "last hired, first fired."
If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires they
be first fired and the remaining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last hired,
first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still be "first fired"
as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because of dis-
crimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to change
existing seniority lists.
Id. at 7217.
24. Id. at 2727.
25. Id. at 2728.
26. Id. at 11,926, 11,930-34 (1964). Senator Humphrey explained that the addition of 703(h)
"merely clarifies [Title VII's] present intent and effect." Id. at 12,723.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit sys-
tem, ... provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ... .28
Neither the language of section 703(h) nor its surrounding history pro-
vides much guidance regarding what the 88th Congress intended to do with
seniority systems challenged under Title VII.29 Unlike the Dowdy Amend-
ment, which would have removed from the Act's prohibitions all employment
decisions based on a seniority system, the exemption that was adopted covers
only decisions based on a "bona fide" seniority system, and insulates differ-
ences in treatment based on such systems only if they are not the result of an
"intention to discriminate" on the basis of race. 30 Moreover, the Clark-Case
memorandum and the other similar statements contending that Title VII in its
original form did not intrude on seniority systems or last hired-first fired layoff
practices were prepared and submitted prior to the proposal and approval of
section 703(h) and thus are of little help in interpreting its language.
What did Congress mean by "bona fide seniority system"? Can we have
a "bona fide" seniority system that nevertheless produces differences in treat-
ment which are the "result of an intention to discriminate"? Or do both re-
quirements rise and fall together? And, perhaps more problematical, does the
proviso's "intention to discriminate" language refer to the seniority system it-
self (i e., a seniority system negotiated, designed, or maintained with the inten-
28. Id.
29. As two commentators put it: "The conclusion that will be drawn from the language of
Title VII and its legislative history will undoubtedly reflect the observer's disposition on the ab-
stract question of whether the application of seniority rules to new black workers in a formerly
white-only seniority unit constitutes discrimination on grounds of race." Cooper & Sobol, supra
note 17, at 1611.
The ambiguity of the legislative history is illustrated by one writer's difficulty in drawing any
consistent conclusions. Compare Note, Last Hired, supra note 17, at 1548 ("The legislative history
of Title VII is a major obstacle to reforming seniority systems under the theory that present em-
ployment decisions based on criteria which reflect past discrimination are prohibited."), with id. at
1549 (Referring to the fact that the Clark/Case memo states that an employer cannot base future
hiring decisions on referral waiting lists compiled in a discriminatory manner before the Act:
"The force of this history is not clear, however, because there are some indications that where
Congress realized that nondiscrimination in the future could not be accomplished without frus-
trating the expectations of white employees, the goal of nondiscrimination was to prevail.").
30. The ambiguities in the language of § 703(h), as compared with the clear command of the
Dowdy proposal, no doubt reflect the fact that the section represented a political compromise. It
has been reported that some form of seniority protection was demanded by the AFL-CIO as a
condition for its legislative support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See W. MURPHY, J. GETMAN
& J. JONES, supra note 8, at 168; see also Poplin, supra note 8, at 195.
The Supreme Court has observed with regard to another Title VII provision:
It is unquestionably true that the 1964 statute was enacted to implement the con-
gressional policy against discriminatory employment practices, and that that basic policy
must inform construction of this remedial legislation. It must also be recognized, how-
ever, in light of the tempestuous legislative proceedings that produced the Act, that the
ultimate product reflects other, perhaps countervailing purposes that some members of
Congress sought to achieve. The present language was clearly the result of a compro-
mise. It is our task to give effect to the statute as enacted.
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-19 (1980).
19841
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tion to discriminate) or does it also include a neutral system that perpetuates a
past "intention to discriminate" (ie., a past refusal to hire black workers)?
Moreover, what does "intention to discriminate" mean? Does it require a
showing of actual motive, or the mere foreseeability of the discriminatory re-
sults, or simply that the employer has acted deliberately and not accidentally?
On this last point, it is significant that Title VII uses "intent" language in
three of its other provisions: the test clause of section 703(h) 3' with regard to
professionally developed ability tests; section 706(g)32 with regard to the relief
a district court may order; and section 707(a)33 with regard to the authority of
the Attorney General to bring a civil action. The courts have interpreted each
of these provisions to require something other than specific intent and discrim-
inatory purpose. The proviso in the ability test clause of section 703(h) has
been read by the Supreme Court to prohibit the use of a test that is not job
related and has a discriminatory impact, regardless of the employer's actual
design or intent, and even if the employer makes good faith efforts to compen-
sate for its discriminatory effect.34 It is equally well settled that use of the term
"intentionally" in section 706(g) to describe the type of discriminatory practice
for which relief is available refers only to conduct that is deliberate, rather
than accidental.35 And the intent requirement of section 707(a) has been con-
31. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to . . .give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
32. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice. ... Id. § 2000e-5(g).
33. Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of
any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a
nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights...
Id. § 2000e-6.
34. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1982). The Court held that this interpreta-
tion is compelled by the legislative history of the provision. This reading of the testing provision
has been favored by the Court since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), see infra
notes 57-67, when it expressly rejected the argument that § 703(h)'s proviso required a showing of
malevolent intent in order to successfully challenge a professionally developed ability test. See
also Albermarle Paper Co, v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). For an early scholarly interpretation
of the testing provision, see Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1637-69. Cooper and Sobol inter-
preted the testing provision as follows:
As soon as an employer is, or should reasonably be, on notice that a test is not predictive
of job performance and is disproportionately screening out blacks, the discrimination
that results can realistically be interpreted as "intended." Intent, under this interpreta-
tion, is not frozen at the time a test is adopted, but rather continues to evolve as the
context of the test changes. Moreover, any test causing this result is being "used" to
discriminate, whether or not so intended.
Id. at 1653.
35. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1395 (2d ed. 1983).
Although the language of the statute appears to require a specific finding that the dis-
crimination was intentional, this requirement has been, to a large degree, judicially elim-
inated. Relying upon the conclusion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., that the thrust of
Title VII is "to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation,"
numerous courts have interpreted "intentionally" to mean that the practices are not "ac-
cidental," and have not required proof that the practices are the result of an intent to
discriminate.
[Vol. 62
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strued to require that the challenged conduct be merely "deliberate." 36
There is no clear support in the language or legislative history of Title VII
to justify a distinction between the intent required in seniority challenges and
the intent required in the other similarly worded provisions. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the ability test clause of section 703(h), for example,
Id See also United States v. Central Motor Lines, 338 F. Supp. 532, 559 (W.D.N.C. 1971), quoted
in Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 885, 890 (S.D. Cal.), a7das modfied, 522 F.2d 1091
(9th Cir. 1975) ("In cases under Title VII, the 'intent' required by the statute may be inferred from
the defendant's conduct. The statute requires only that a defendant has meant to do what was
done; that is, the act or practice must not be accidental."). Thus, in a Griggs-type case alleging
disparate impact, the "intentional" conduct necessary to satisfy § 706(g) exists if the employer
acted deliberately, and not accidentally. See Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th
Cir. 1972). The court wrote in Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970):
Section 706(g) limits injunctive (as opposed to declaratory) relief to cases in which the
employer or union has "intentionally engaged in" an unlawful employment practice.
Again, the statute, read literally, requires only that the defendant meant to do what he
did, that is, his employment practice was not accidental. The relevant legislative history,
quoted in the margin, bears out the language of the statute on that point.
This reading of the intent requirement of § 706(g) seems in accord with the legislative history.
When the section was first introduced, it used the word "willfully," a term stronger than the sub-
stituted "intentionally" in the final version. Senator Dirksen explained the final language as re-
quiring only that the act be engaged in "intentionally or purposely, as distinguished from an
accidental act." 110 CONG. REc. 8194 (1964). See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1674 n.17
and accompanying text.
Cooper and Sobol, agreeing that the legislative history of § 706(g) compels the conclusion
that specific intent is not required, suggested that Congress did not mean the term "intentionally"
to be frozen in time. Rather, once an employer becomes aware of the adverse impact of the
practice, his continuation of it contributes sufficient "intent" to discriminate even if such intent did
not exist earlier. Id. at 1675.
It should be noted that several changes were made in § 706(g) when title VII was amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000.-19 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), but no alteration was made in the intent provision. Interestingly, the section-by-section
analysis prepared by Senator Williams to explain the 1972 Amendments omits mention of the
intent language that was preserved. See 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) ("Section 706(g)-
This subsection is similar to the present section 706(g) of the Act. It authorizes the court, upon a
finding that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice, to
enjoin the respondent .... ").
36. See Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970):
Section 707(a) allows the Attorney General to enforce the Act only where there is a
"pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
subchapter" and where the pattern or practice "is intended to deny the full exercise of the
rights herein described." Defendants contend that no such condition existed here.
The Papermakers court considered Dobbins v. Local 212, International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 292 F. Supp 413, 448 (1968), in which the same point was raised and rejected:
"In reviewing statutes, rules or conduct which result in the effective denial of equal
rights to Negroes or other minority groups, intention can be inferred from the operation
and effect of the statute or rule or from the conduct itself. The conduct of defendant in
the present case "by its very nature" contains the implications of the required intent
Thus the Attorney General has a cause of action when the conduct of a labor
organization in relation to N[egroes] or other minority groups has the effect of creating
and preserving employment opportunitites for W[hites] only. Section 707(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."
Here, as in Dobbins, the conduct engaged in had racially-determined effect. The
requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that the defendants persisted in the con-
duct after its racial implications had become known to them. Section 707(a) demands no
more.
Id at 996-97.
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contradicts the legislative history's explicit language stating that an employer
could set any qualification it desired, regardless of its negative impact on mi-
norities, as long as intent to discriminate was lacking.37 Thus it has been ob-
served: "The legislative history concerning testing is clearly no less adverse to
the result reached in the testing cases than the legislative history dealing with
seniority is to the application of the perpetuation [effect centered] principle3s
to seniority systems."'39 Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next section, the
Court has developed just such a distinction in the meaning of intent. It has
interpreted the seniority proviso as requiring an inquiry into motive and pur-
pose that is not required when applying the other "intent" clauses.
As one writer has observed regarding Title VII and the seniority question:
[Tihe statute conflicts with itself. While on the one hand Con-
gress did wish to protect established seniority rights, on the other it
intended to expedite black integration into the economic mainstream
and to end, once and for all, the de facto discrimination which re-
placed slavery at the end of the Civil War.40
Given this schizophrenic intent of the 88th Congress, "it is perhaps not unrea-
sonable to conclude . . . that Congress chose to leave the resolution of the
problems posed by seniority to the courts rather than codify in the act the
concerns expressed in the Senate debates."'4 t A major issue to be resolved was
the meaning of "intention to discriminate" as set out in section 703(h).
B. The Seniority Question-The Early Case Law4 2
Title VII became effective in 1965 and, not suprisingly, one of the first
questions to be litigated was the Act's treatment of seniority. For places of
employment that previously had been racially segregated or exclusive, these
former practices had a continuing impact on employment opportunities
through the operation of the seniority system. Minorities who had been
steered into segregated, low-paying jobs before 1965 found that their newly
won right to transfer to better jobs often meant a forfeiture of their accumu-
lated seniority. This was because many plants operated under departmental,
not company, seniority systems. Seniority built up in an all-black mainte-
nance department could not, for example, be transferred to the better paying
production department, and thus transfer meant that the minority employee
would come into the newly integrated department with the same seniority as a
new company employee. Thus, he was at the bottom of the pecking order for
37. See Note, Last Hired, supra note 17, at 1551-52.
38. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
39. Note, Last Hired, supra note 17, at. 1551.
40. Poplin, supra note 8, at 191.
41. Note, Last Hired, supra note 17, at 1550. See also Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at
1614.
42. The case law development under § 703(h) has been the subject of much recent attention.
See Kasold, Toward Denition of the Bona Fide Seniority System, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 41 (1983);
Marinelli, Seniority Systems and Title VII, 14 AKRON L. REV. 253 (1980); Zimmer, Title VII:
Treatment ofSeniority Systems, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 79 (1980).
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promotion and assignment, and was also subject to the real risk of seniority
based layoff if the plant's work slowed down. Consequently, blacks were en-
couraged to remain in their segregated, but relatively secure, low-paying posi-
tions. Seniority-based decisionmaking thus locked minorities into the jobs
given them by prior overt discrimination. For minorities who had been ex-
cluded entirely from a shop, use of the seniority factor would perpetuate the
prior discrimination into future decisionmaking.
On the other hand, however, was the significant place that seniority occu-
pied in American labor-management relations.43 Basing promotions, layoffs,
and other decisions on seniority had become common throughout unionized
industry. Seniority is perceived as serving the interests of the main actors in
the workplace.44 To the union, employer, and worker, seniority is a neutral
criterion for making decisions, viewed as an improvement on systems leaving
individual discretion in the hands of supervisors. It is thus an important sell-
ing point for organizers attempting to market unionization to the workers. It
permits workers to predict their future employment positions. "American la-
bor has long favored the use of strict seniority systems because of the job se-
curity they foster. Length of service provides a uniform objective standard by
which an employer may measure benefits such as pension rights, promotions,
transfers, and job protection. Seniority thus eliminates subjective or arbitrary
treatment of employees. . . .,,a Finally, seniority systems help the employer
retain its more experienced employees.
United States District Judge Butzner, sitting in Virginia, faced the
unenviable task of interpreting section 703(h) as a matter of first impression.
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 46 involved a plant that, until 1966, was formally
segregated and in which the collective bargaining agreement prohibited trans-
fer from the black prefabrication department to the better paying white ship-
ping department. In 1966 the collective bargaining agreement was amended
to permit employees to transfer from prefabrication to shipping, but only with
a complete loss of seniority because of the departmental (not company) senior-
ity computation. Quarles, a black man employed by Philip Morris for nine
years as a laborer in the prefabrication department, had sought unsuccessfully
a transfer to a driver position in shipping prior to 1966. The new collective
bargaining agreement gave him the opportunity to transfer to the shipping
department, but, since he would begin in that department with no seniority at
43. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1601-02 ("The use of competitive status seniority
to govern promotions, demotions, and layoffs is a fundamental aspect of industrial relations in this
country. In nearly all businesses of significant size whose employees are organized, a seniority
system plays some role in determining the allocation of the work."). The other type of seniority,
benefit seniority, determines entitlement to fringe benefits. The Title VII problem has arisen pri-
marily with regard to competitive seniority. See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1961).
44. See generally Aaron, supra note 43; Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1595, 1604-07;
Note, supra note 8, at 168.
45. Note, supra note 8, at 528 (footnotes omitted).
46. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). This case as well as the other early cases mentioned
below are discussed generally in Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1615-29; Poplin, supra note 8,
at 180-85; Note, Last Hired, supra note 17, at 1545-57.
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all, he would not be able to obtain a driver position.47 Quarles sued under
Title VII, challenging this transfer and seniority policy.
Noting that Quarles, if he transfered, "would find himself junior to white
employees holding less employment seniority [and] who got their positions by
reason of the company's former racially segregated employment policy," 43
Judge Butzner held that Title VII had been violated. The departmental trans-
fer and seniority practices, superimposed on a racially segregated plant, had
the effect of perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. The court read
section 703(h)'s requirement that a seniority system be "bona fide" before it is
protected from challenge as requiring a lack of discriminatory effect, 4 9 even if
the system itself had not been shown to result from a discriminatory purpose.
Judge Butzner went on to interpret the section 703(h) proviso "that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race" as
referring to the intentional discrimination committed by Philip Morris up until
1966:
The differences between the terms and conditions of employ-
ment for whites and negroes about which plaintiffs complain are the
result of intention to discriminate in hiring policies on the basis of
race before January 1, 1966. The differences that originated before
the act are maintained now. The act does not condone present differ-
ences that are the result of intention to discriminate before the effec-
tive date of the act, although such a provision could have been
included in the act had Congress so intended. The court holds that
the present differences in departmental seniority of negroes and
whites that result from the company's intentional, racially discrimi-
natory hiring policy before January 1, 1966 are not validated by the
provisions of § 703(h).50
Judge Butzner dispensed with the legislative history of section 703(h) with the
observation that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of
negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act."51
47. Quarles thus presents one of three paradigm cases of perpetuation of past discrimination
through operation of a seniority system; black applicants were previously steered into undesirable
departments, and loss-of-seniority provisions prevent their subsequent transfer. In the other cases,
blacks were either denied employment entirely in the past, and thus, when finally hired years later,
lacked accumulated seniority possessed by their white colleagues; or blacks were deterred from
applying because they knew such effort would be futile, and when ultimately hired find them-
selves attempting to catch-up in seniority credits. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1602-03.
48. Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 514.
49. Id. at 517.
50. Id. at 517-18. The court added that the system could not be justified by any showing of
business necessity, since the employer's need could be met by rejecting unqualified candidates for
promotion. See id at 518.
51. Id. at 516. The cases that follow Quarles are collected in Note, Last Hired, supra note 17,
at 1554-55 n.5; Note, supra note 8, at 526 n.17. In Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-
CIO, CLC v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), Judge
Wisdom adopted a similar view:
Title VII. . . prohibits discrimination in all aspects of employment. In this case we
deal with one of the most perplexing issues troubling the courts under Title VII: how to
reconcile equal employment opportunity today with seniority expectations based onyes-
terday's built-in racial discrimination. May an employer continue to award formerly
"white jobs" on the basis of seniority attained in other formerly white jobs, or must the
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C. Griggs and the Impact Doctrine-Liabi y Without Fault
Following the early case law on the seniority question, a development of
tremendous significance occurred in Title VII doctrine with the Supreme
Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 52 The Griggs theory of disparate
impact discrimination, invalidating employment practices that have an ad-
verse effect on protected group members even if the employer has no demon-
strable purpose to discriminate, seemed to support both the reasoning and
result of Quarles.
Griggs involved a challenge to Duke Power's use of general intelligence
tests and a high school diploma requirement to select candidates for certain
jobs. The statistics showed that a substantially higher proportion of blacks
than whites would be rejected on the basis of the screening requirements, but
there was no evidence indicating that the employer had adopted the require-
ments with the intent to cause this effect. 53
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision authored by its new Chief
Justice, held that Title VII requires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of a racial or other impermissible classification." 54
Chief Justice Burger continued:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited. 55
The Court noted that the evidence failed to establish a "demonstrable
relationship" between the screening requirements, which excluded dispropor-
tionate numbers of blacks, and the jobs in question. The lower court's finding
that they were adopted without any "intention to discriminate against Negro
employees" was not determinative. The Court explained:
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built
in headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability. . .[because] Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
employer consider the employee's experience in formerly "Negro jobs" as an equivalent
measure of seniority?. We affirm the decision of the district court. We hold that Crown
Zellerbach's job seniority system in effect at its Bogalusa Paper Mill prior to February 1,
1968, was unlawful because by carrying forward the effects of former discrimination
practices the system results in present and future discrimination. When a Negro appli-
cant has the qualifications to handle a particular job, the Act requires that Negro senior-
ity be equated with white seniority.
Id. at 982-83.
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. See id. at 425-26, 432.
54. Id. at 431.
55. Id.
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motivation. 56
The Court decided Griggs after expressly recognizing that section 703(h)
authorizes the use of "any professionally developed ability test" that is not
"designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race."' 57 The Court
gave short shrift to this apparent "intent" requirement by reading its legisla-
tive history to require that a test, to come within the exemption, must be job-
related; if not, the test must fall regardless of the employer's intent or
purpose.58
Griggs represented a turning point in the way the Court viewed discrimi-
nation. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, by identifying "inferior education in
segregated schools"'5 9 as the reason why the plaintiffs would be disproportion-
ately harmed by the screening devices in question, recognized the broad socie-
tal causes of employment discrimination.60 By focusing on "the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation,"61 the Court acknowl-
edged that minorities were being systematically disadvantaged even in situa-
tions in which the employer had no specific desire to cause that result, or at
least when no such desire could be proved in court. If minorities could chal-
lenge only those practices in which the employer left behind a trail of evidence
of animus, the Court seemed to be saying, the congressional objective to
achieve equality of employment opportunities would remain an empty
dream.62
Impact theory has developed after Griggs into a well-established and in-
dependent avenue of challenge to any selection practice that has a disparate
impact on a protected group and cannot be shown to be job-related or business
justified. Requirements subject to challenge include education and experi-
56. Id. at 432. Thus, the Court adopted a functional equivalent of race analysis: if the selec-
tion criteria excludes disproportionate numbers of minorities and is not related to productivity,
then it is the functional equivalent of an overt racial criteria and should be prohibited. See Fiss,A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 235, 237-40 (1971). As Professor Schnapper
has noted, unless such covert discrimination is prohibited, it could provide the pretext for overt
discrimination; that is, the decisionmaker could devise a neutral rule with the same impact as
direct exclusion. See Schnapper, Two Categories ofDiscriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 31, 49 (1982).
57. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433, 436.
58. Id. at 431.
59. Id. at 430.
60. As one writer has observed: "Given the tragic history of relations between the races in
this country, nearly all current uneven impact may ultimately be traceable to prior official discrim-
ination." Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdudi-
cat on, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 54 (1977).
61. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
62. In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
individual or organization. Experience has shown this to be false.
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a ... complex and pervasive phe-
nomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms
of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on
the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and
lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory practices
through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements.
S. REP. No. 415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
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ence, minimum height or weight, and physical strength tests.63 The Supreme
Court has summarized the two different types of discrimination proscribed by
Title VII:
Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favora-
bly than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity . ... Proof of discrimina-
tory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory. 4
The Griggs doctrine is really a form of liability without fault, or strict
liability.6 5 The employer's conduct is held to violate the law not because the
discriminatory effect is intentional, reckless, or negligent. Rather, the employer
63. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 13; C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R.
RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 16 (1980). As Profes-
sor Bartholet has observed:
The impact doctrine has been an enormously powerful weapon for plaintiffs, because it
removes any necessity to prove illicit motive on the employer's part, and because the
burden of proof placed on the employer to show job relatedness has turned out to be
very difficult to satisfy.
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII- United States Postal Bd. of Govenors v.
Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1982).
64. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Impact
theory is presently in disfavor with the Reagan Admininstration, which has spoken out against its
application. See Bartholet, supra note 63, at 1204 n.12.
65. As Professor Epstein noted:
The development of the common law of tort has been marked by the opposition
between two major theories. The first holds a plaintiff should be entitled, prima facie, to
recover from a defendant who has caused him harm only if the defendant intended to
harm the plaintiff or failed to take reasonable steps to avoid inflicting the harm. The
alternative theory, that of strict liability, holds the defendant prima facie liable for the
harm caused whether or not either of the two further conditions relating to negligence
and intent is satisfied.
Epstein, .4 Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 152 (1973). See generally R. RAnIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (2d ed. 1983).
The historical genesis and progression of the two standards has generated much scholarship
and debate. See Epstein, supra; Posner,A4 Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972); Pos-
ner, Strict Liability: .4 Comment, 2 J. LEo. STUD. 205 (1973); Rabin, The Historical Development of
Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981). The traditional view of legal
historians has been summarized by Posner:
Until the nineteenth century a man was liable for harm caused by his accidents whether
or not he was at fault; he acted at his peril. The no-fault standard of liability was relaxed
in the nineteenth century under the pressure of industrial expansion and an individualis-
tic philosophy that could conceive of no justification for shifting losses from the victim of
an accident unless the injurer was blameworthy (negligent) and the victim blameless (not
contributorily negligent).
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is liable because his conduct caused harm to a protected group of employees
and was not justified by a business necessity.66 Lack of discriminatory motive,
or even the presence of good faith is no defense. The Court has rejected any
subjective test of state of mind and opted for an objective test based on statisti-
cal impact. As with the development of no-fault liability in other areas, the
effects test reflects the perceived need for a system of remedies without the
expense (to claimants and the judicial system) of establishing fault. 67
Quarles had prophetically applied impact theory to a seniority system
that "neutrally" produced disparate results. In support of Quarles's reason-
ing, Professors Cooper and Sobol wrote:
[S]eniority and testing violate fair employment laws in situations
where an adverse racial impact is not adequately justified, without
regard to the motive of the employer in adopting the practices. This
shift away from a restrictive focus on the state of mind of the em-
ployer is essential to the effective enforcement of fair employment
laws, not merely because specific intent is difficult to prove, but be-
cause there is frequently no discriminatory intent underlying the
adoption of seniority and testing practices, or a wide variety of other
objective and apparently neutral conditions to hire and promotion.
These conditions are possibly the most important contemporary ob-
stacles to the employment and promotion of qualified black
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra, at 29.
As an observer suggested at the turn of the century:
The early law asked simply, "Did the defendant do the physical act which damaged
the plaintiff?" The law of today, except in certain cases based upon public policy, asks
the further question, "Was the act blameworthy?" The ethical standard of reasonable
conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's peril.
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 99 (1908), quoted in Epstein, supra, at 153. See also
Perkins, A Rationale ofMens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905 (1930), and Remington & Helstad, The
MentalElement in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 644, 648-52, tracing the simi-
lar development of fault notions in criminal law.
Professor Rabin rejects this historical view. He concludes that the preindustrial era was dom-
inated instead by a "no-liability," rather than strict liability, principle, which was carried over
from property law concepts of status and immunity. See Rabin, supra, at 927, 959. He contends
that the fault notions developed during the industrial era actually expanded, rather than con-
tracted, the scope of liability. Id. at 928, 960. Rabin further concludes that during the supposed
heyday of fault liability, in the 19th century, many unintended harms were governed by principles
other than fault, such as status notions of trespasser and invitee, which determined the appropriate
standard of care. Id. at 933, 945.
It does appear uncontraverted that the earliest civil action in English law, trespass, was not
based on any notion of fault--the essence of the action was that the defendant had voluntarily
committed some afflirmative act which caused a direct and immediate injury to the plaintiff, e.g.,
assault and battery. Therefore, liability was strict. The action on the case, which developed later,
required proof of defendant's fault, ie., that his conduct was illegal, intentionally wrongful, or
unreasonably dangerous. See Epstein, supra, at 187.
It is this author's belief that the case law development of standards and doctrine under Title
VII should be informed by the experience in the more established bodies of doctrine, particularly
tort. See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292 (1982); see also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
66. While some might argue that the use of a screening device that adversely affects minori-
ties and is not justified by business reasons raises an inference of discriminatory motive, neither
motive, intent, or even negligence (ie., continuing a practice that unnecessarily screens out minor-
ities) is an element of a Griggs-based claim. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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workers.68
Later, however, when the Supreme Court ruled on the seniority question,
it interpreted section 703(h) to preclude the application of the impact theory to
seniority challenges.
D. Franks, Teamsters, and Evans-The Formulation of the Intent
Requirement
The Supreme Court did not address the seniority question until it decided
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. ,69 several years after Quarles. Franks
was a Title VII class action alleging that the employer and union had engaged
in racially discriminatory hiring, transfer, and discharge policies. The district
court found that the employer had, after the effective date of Title VII, unlaw-
fully excluded minority persons from the favored over-the-road (OTR) posi-
tions, and that the collective bargaining agreement perpetuated this
discrimination through the use of its unit seniority system. The case went to
the Supreme Court on the question whether the victims of the discrimination
(both those whose applications had been rejected and those who had been
hired but were steered into the less desirable jobs) could obtain seniority relief
under Title VII.
The Court held that section 703(h) does not bar seniority relief for those
victims of post-Act discrimination who, but for the discrimination, would have
enjoyed the seniority status now sought.70 Writing for the Court, Justice Bren-
nan observed that plaintiffs' underlying claim was not the operation of a dis-
criminatory seniority system, but instead was the discriminatory initial hiring
system; and the relief sought was not directed at modifying or abolishing the
seniority system, but only at an award of constructive seniority to compensate
for the past hiring discrimination.7 ' Section 703(h), to the Court, was a provi-
sion defining unlawful employment practices, and not a provision limiting the
relief that could be awarded once an unlawful practice was found.72 After
reviewing its legislative history, Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he 'thrust' of [§ 703(h)] is directed toward defining what is and
what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which
the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetu-
ating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date
of the Act. There is no indication in the legislative materials that
§ 703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropri-
ate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effec-
tive date of the Act is proved-as in the instant case, a discriminatory
refusal to hire.73
68. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1670-71.
69. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
70. Id. at 757-62.
71. Id. at 758.
72. Id. at 758-59.
73. Id. at 761-62. As Justice Powell put it in his separate opinion, the " 'thrust' of [§ 703(h)]
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The Court noted that seniority status at Bowman determined competitive
position in layoff and recall, as well as in assignments and benefits like the
length of vacation and size of pension payments. Indeed, the Court recog-
nized generally that "[s]eniority systems and the entitlements conferred by
credits earned thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in the eco-
nomic employment system of this nation."
74
Without an award of seniority dating from the time when he
was discriminatorily refused employment, an individual who applies
for and obtains employment as an OTR driver pursuant to the Dis-
trict Court's order will never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy
of seniority according to which these various employment benefits
are distributed. He will perpetually remain subordinate to persons
who, but for the illegal discrimination, would have been in respect to
entitlement to these benefits his inferiors. 7
5
The award of constructive seniority for any particular individual was left in
"the sound equitable discretion of the district courts."' 76 Thus, following a
determination of classwide liability, the trial court would conduct a hearing to
determine which members of the class were actual victims of the practice-
were qualified applicants for available positions during the period of the
violations. 77
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's first treatment of the seniority question
under Title VII did not discuss the "intention to discriminate" proviso of sec-
tion 703(h). The Franks Court apparently was able to avoid having to con-
strue that provision by categorizing the seniority issue before it as a remedial
one-given a past hiring violation, could the victim be awarded constructive
is the validation of seniority plans in existence on the effective date of Title VII." Id at 791
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 766.
75. Id. at 767-68. The Court noted that "the issue of seniority relief cuts to the very heart of
Title VII's primary objective of eradicating present and future discrimination." Id. at 768 n.28.
The Court explicitly rejected Bowman's argument that seniority relief was inappropriate be-
cause such relief diminishes the expectations of innocent white employees, observing that "there is
nothing in the language of Title VII, or in its legislative history, to show that Congress intended
generally to bar this form of relief to victims of illegal discrimination." Id. at 774. The Court
further emphasized that a grant of retroactive seniority to victims did not amount to a complete
overhaul of the seniority system or to a deprivation of the seniority status of white employees, but
only a -modification of the system and the placing of victims into seniority, slots in which they
would have been but for the discrimination. The Court characterized its decision as one that
divided the burden of past discrimination in hiring among discriminatee and nondiscriminatee
employees, leaving the issue of the extent to which this burden might ultimately be placed on the
wrongdoer-the employer-to a further date. Id. at 777 n.38.
Certainly there is no argument that the award of retroactive seniority to the victims of
hiring discrimination in any way deprives other employees of indefeasibly vested rights
conferred by the employment contract. The Court has long held that employee expecta-
tions arising from a seniority system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a
strong public interest.
Id. at 778.
76. Id. at 770.
77. Id. at 772. The burden of proof at this individual remedy stage was placed on the em-
ployer. Id.
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seniority? It should be noted, however, that the original hiring violations
before the Court were intentional, not merely impact, violations.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,78 decided the
following year, the Court for the first time considered the "intent" proviso.
The Department of Justice had brought an action under Title VII against a
nationwide motor freight carrier and the union representing many of its em-
ployees. The government's basic allegations, as in Franks, were that the com-
pany had engaged in a pre- and post-Act pattern and practice of intentional
discrimination against black and Spanish-surnamed applicants by steering
them into low-paying local city driver positions, and that the collective bar-
gaining agreements locked in the effects of this past discrimination through a
unit seniority system which provided that a local city driver who transferred to
a line driver job lost all the seniority he had accumulated in the previous unit.
The government sought relief that, among other things, would permit dis-
criminatees to transfer to line driver jobs with full company seniority. Both
the district court and court of appeals sustained the government's allegations
of pre- and post-Act hiring discrimination and further held that the seniority
system violated Title VII by perpetuating the discrimination. Concerning the
seniority system, the district court issued injunctive relief permitting minority
employees to transfer accumulated seniority within the company. The com-
pany and union also were generally enjoined from committing further viola-
tions, thus putting in issue "the legality of the seniority system" itself.79
The Supreme Court agreed that the government had proved systemwide
and purposeful racial steering before and after the effective date of Title VII.
Thus, under Franks, identifiablepost-Act discriminatees were entitled to retro-
active seniority. The perpetuation ofpre-Act hiring discrimination, however,
was held not to violate Title VII because section 703(h) reflected "the congres-
sional judgment. . . that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing sen-
iority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of
employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior
to the passage of the Act." 80 Therefore, pre-Act discriminatees were not enti-
tled to seniority relief. The seniority system was held protected by section
703(h); thus, the union's agreement to create and maintain the system did not
violate Title VII, as had been held below.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, explained:
Were it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would
seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart of the system is its
allocation of the choicest jobs, the greatest protection against layoffs,
and other advantages to those employees who have been line drivers
for the longest time. Where, because of the employer's prior inten-
tional discrimination, the line drivers with the largest tenure are
without exception white, the advantages of seniority system flow dis-
78. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
79. Id. at 348 n.30.
80. Id. at 353.
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proportionately to them and away from Negro and Spanish-sur-
named employees who might by now have enjoyed those advantages
had not the employer discriminated before the passage of the Act.
This disproportionate distribution of advantage does in a very real
sense "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices." But both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the
legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered
this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of
immunity to them.8 '
It is apparent that § 703(h) was drafted with an eye toward
meeting the earlier criticism on this issue [of seniority] with an ex-
plicit provision embodying the understanding and assurances of the
Act's proponents namely, that Title VII would not outlaw such dif-
ferences in treatment among employees as flowed from a bona fide
seniority system that allowed for full exercise of seniority accumu-
lated before the effective date of the Act.82
Moreover, since post-Act discriminatees were entitled to retroactive seniority
on an individual basis, the Court reasoned that declaring this seniority system
unlawful served no purpose, since "such a holding would in no way enlarge
the relief to be awarded. 8 3
The Court then turned its attention to the question of which seniority sys-
tems were entitled to immunity from a Quarles type challenge, specifically to
section 703(h)'s requirements that the system be "bona fide" and that any dif-
ferences in treatment not be "the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race." The Court adopted a standard focusing on the racial neutrality of
the purpose behind the seniority system. The Court rejected the government's
81. Id. at 349-50.
82. Id. at 352.
83. Id. at 348 n.30. The Court's equating of individual constructive seniority with systemic
injunctive relief directed against the seniority system itself overlooks the apparent significant dif-
ferences between the two. The former amounts to tinkering with the system to slot in those persons
who were subjected to post-Act discrimination, filed timely charges against that discrimination,
see United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), discussed infra notes 92-100 and accompany-
ing text, and now seek a position with the offending employer for which constructive seniority
would be beneficial. The systemic remedy, of course, provides the court much more flexibility in
revising seniority practices to undo the effects of post-Act discriminatory policies. Cf. Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 361 n.47.
The cumbersome nature of the individual remedy was recognized by the Court in Teamsters:
The task remaining for the District Court on remand will not be a simple one. Ini-
tially, the court will have to make a substantial number of individual determinations in
deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims of the company's discrimi-
natory practices. After the victims have been identified, the court must, as nearly as
possible, "'recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there
been no'" unlawful discrimination. This process of recreating the past will necessarily
involve a degree of approximation and imprecision.
Id. at 371-72 (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 769). And that is not the end of the road because "after
the victims have been identified and their rightful place determined, the District Court will again
be faced with the delicate task of adjusting the remedial interest of discriminatees and the legiti-
mate expectations of other employees innocent of any wrongdoing." Id. at 372. Thus the Franks
individual remedy is not an automatic one. See, e.g., Romasanta v. United Air Lines, 717 F.2d
1140, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying victims full retroactive competitive seniority because of the
"unusual adverse impact" it would have on incumbents).
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arguments that no seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimi-
nation can be "bona fide" and that any seniority system which perpetuates
past discrimination by definition causes differences in treatment that are "the
result of an intention to discriminate."'84 The system at bar was deemed bona
fide because it applied to all races and ethnic groups; to the extent it locked
employees into their jobs, it locked all employees (black and white) into those
jobs; the establishment of separate bargaining units was rational, in accord
with industry practice, and consistent with National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) precedent; the system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination;
and it was negotiated and had been maintained free from any illegal
purpose.8 5
Justices Marshall (joined by Justice Brennan) filed a separate opinion in
which he dissented from the majority's treatment of the seniority question. In
his view, section 703(h) did not immunize seniority systems that perpetuated
the effects of either pre- or post-Act discrimination. The dissent noted that the
differences in treatment produced by the seniority system at bar were
precisely the result of prior, intentional discrimination in assigning
jobs; but for that discrimination, Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Americans would not be disadvantaged by the system. Thus, if the
proviso is read literally, the instant case falls squarely within it,
thereby rendering § 703(h) inapplicable. To avoid this result the
Court is compelled to reconstruct the proviso to read: provided that
such a "seniority system" did not have its genesis in racial discrimi-
nation, and that it was negotiated and has been maintained free from
any illegal purpose."86
Justice Marshall found nothing in the legislative history of Title VII to
"warrant this radical reconstruction of the proviso."'8 7 In his view, "the legis-
lative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not support the conclusion that
Congress intended to legalize seniority systems that perpetuate discrimination,
and administrative and legislative developments since 1964 positively refute
that conclusion."'88 As the dissent saw it: "Congress was concerned with sen-
iority expectations that had developed prior to the enactment of Title VII, not
with expectations arising thereafter to the extent that those expectations were
dependent on whites benefiting from unlawful discrimination." 89 These con-
clusions were based in part on "the devastating impact of today's holding vali-
dating such systems"; in effect it "write[s] off an entire generation of minority
group employees" and "postpone[s] for one generation the achievement of
economic equality."90 Congress, it was suggested, could not have intended
this result.
84. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 353 & n.38.
85. Id. at 355-56.
86. Id. at 382 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
87. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 384 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 387-88 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Teamsters thus provides two conflicting interpretations of the "intention
to discriminate" proviso of section 703(h). The dissent's reading refers back to
the original act of discrimination that the seniority system perpetuates, and
inquires whether that act was "intentional." If it was, the differences in treat-
ment through the operation of the system are "the result of an intention to
discriminate," and thus section 703(h) does not immunize the system.91 The
majority, on the other hand, reads the intent requirement of the proviso as
referring to the seniority system itself, and inquires whether the system repre-
sents a racially-motivated decision on the part of its creators.
UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. Evans92 extended further the protection of senior-
ity systems that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. The action was
brought by a flight attendant who had been employed by United from 1966 to
1968. During this period, United maintained a policy of refusing to allow mar-
ried women to serve as flight attendants. 93 Therefore, when Evans married in
1968, she was forced to resign. The no-marriage policy was subsequently chal-
lenged and held unlawful under Title VII,94 but Evans was not a party to that
action and did not initiate her own action against United at the time. Evans
successfully sought re-employment with United in 1972, but for seniority pur-
poses she was treated as a new employee, with no credit for her prior service. 95
When United refused her requests to credit her pre-1972 seniority, she filed
her Title VII action.
Evans argued that the seniority system as applied to her gave present ef-
fect to the past post-Act illegal practice and thus was itself unlawful. The
Supreme Court agreed that the past discriminatory conduct was indeed still
haunting Evans, but affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that "[a]
discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal
equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was
passed."96 Therefore, under the Teamsters doctrine, the perpetuation of such
discrimination was immunized from challenge under section 703(h). "United
was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to file a
charge of discrimination" within the statutory time period.97
The Court added that United's seniority system denied seniority credit for
prior service to both males and females who had resigned or were terminated,
and thus was "neutral in its operation. s98 Thus Evans had failed to establish,
pursuant to section 703(h), either that the seniority system was not bona fide or
that it was intentionally designed to discriminate because of sex.
91. It is unclear how the dissenters would treat an original impact violation, e.g., the uninten-
tional use of a nonvalidated examination, that was perpetuated by a seniority system.
92. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
93. Id. at 554.
94. Sproges v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
95. Evans, 431 U.S. at 555.
96. Id. at 558.
97. Id. "A contrary view," the Court noted, "would substitute a claim for seniority credit for
almost every claim which is barred by limitations." Id. at 560.
98. Id. at 558. This observation ignores, of course, the nonneutrality of the no-marriage rule,
which forced out only females, and not males.
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The dissent noted that:
But for her sex, respondent Carolyn Evans presently would enjoy all
of the seniority rights that she seeks through this litigation. Peti-
tioner United Air Lines has denied her those rights pursuant to a
policy that perpetuates past discrimination by awarding the choicest
jobs to those possessing a credential married women were unlawfully
prevented from acquiring: continuous tenure with United.99
Justices Marshall (joined by Justice Brennan) reiterated his view, expressed in
Teamsters, that section 703(h) does not immunize seniority systems that per-
petuatepost-Act discrimination. In his opinion, "The consequence of Ms. Ev-
ans' failure to file charges after she was discharged is that she has lost her right
to backpay, not her right to challenge present wrongs."100
After Franks, Teamsters, and Evans,10 1 plaintiffs could attack seniority
systems on a class-wide basis, and thus obtain systemic relief, only by showing
99. Id. at 560-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 562 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Other Supreme Court decisions dealt with the seniority question under Title VII in a
more summary fashion. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), involved a claim
of religious discrimination based on the employer's and union's refusal to permit the plaintiff to
avoid work on his Sabbath. Shift assignments were controlled by seniority, and plaintiff's request
for reassignment would have required a modification of the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court upheld plaintiff's termination for refusing to work his
designated shift, rejecting his Title VII claim with the observation that "absent a discriminatory
purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if
the system has some discriminatory consequences." Id. at 82.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), involved a practice that required pregnant
employees to take a leave of absence without sick pay and with loss of all accumulated seniority.
Sick pay and seniority retention were available for disabilities other than pregnancy. The loss of
seniority meant that Satty could return to her position only if no incumbent employee also sought
it. The Court held that the seniority practice as applied to pregnant employees violated Title VII,
reasoning that it had a discriminatory effect on females, was not justified by a business necessity,
and thus ran afoul of Griggs. The Court seemed untroubled by § 703(h), which it failed to discuss
despite the obvious issues raised under the section. The omission may have occurred because the
claim was not that past discrimination was perpetuated by a neutral rule, but, rather, that the
seniority rules were explicitly gender-related, and thus not within the § 703(h) exemption. See
Zimmer, supra note 42, at 95-96.
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), was a successful challenge to the air-
line's practice of grounding female flight attendants who became mothers while permitting male
attendants who became fathers to continue flying. Over the objection of the union, which had not
itself been found guilty of discrimination, the Court affirmed a settlement decree awarding senior-
ity relief to identifiable victims of the discrimination. The Court held that a finding that the union
had engaged in discrimination was not necessary for such an award.
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982), involved a discriminatory refusal to hire
women for particular positions. After charges were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), Ford offered the victims the jobs they had sought, but without seniority
retroactive to the date of refusal. The women did not accept the jobs. When the Title VII case
was litigated in court, and Ford lost, it argued that the women were not entitled to recover
backpay accruing after the dates on which the offers of employment had been declined. The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that an employer can toll the continuing accrual of back pay
liability by offering the claimant the job that had been denied, even though retroactive seniority is
not part of the offer. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, suggested that this rule would
encourage voluntary settlement of these disputes while at the same time avoiding "the deteriora-
tion in morale, labor unrest, and reduced productivity that may be engendered by inserting the
claimant into the seniority ladder over the heads of the incumbents who have earned their places
through their work on the job." Id. at 3064. In light of the fact that "seniority plays a central role
in allocating benefits and burdens among employees ... , we should be wary of any rule that
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that the system was set up as a part of a scheme to maintain a discriminatory
workplace. In Teamsters, therefore, the unit seniority system survived scrutiny
even though the almost total exclusion of minority employees from line-driver
jobs could only have been maintained through the operation of that very sys-
tem. Short of a showing of discriminatory purpose, seniority systems are sub-
ject only to modification by way of constructive seniority for identifiable
victims of post-Act hiring violations, and then only when those violations were
made the subject of timely charges by the victims. In a typical last hired-first
fired case, in which reverse seniority layoffs operate to reduce the percentage
of minority or female employees to pre-Act levels, such tinkering with the sys-
tem will do little to protect the equal opportunity gains of recent years.' 0 2
. Pullman-Standard v. Swint and American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson-
The Parameters of Discriminatory Intent
Pullman-Standard v. Swint'0 3 and American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson 104
represent a culmination of the debate on the seniority question and an elabo-
ration of the Court's "intent" standard under section 703(h). Patterson raised
the issue whether section 703(h) applied to seniority systems adopted after the
effective date of Title VII. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split, answered in the
affirmative, 10 5 thus extending the scope of the intent requirement. The facts
before the Court presented the familiar assertion that past discrimination in
hiring and assignment was being perpetuated by the use of seniority (here in
the form of lines of progression that controlled advancement). Defendants
contended that section 703(h) protected this seniority system unless there was
a showing of discriminatory intent. The court of appeals held, however, that
section 703(h) applied only to systems in existence on Title VII's effective date,
and thus did not immunize these lines of progression, established years later,
from an impact challenge. The Supreme Court noted that the plain language
of section 703(h) applied to post-Act as well as pre-Act seniority systems, and
rejected the view that the provision was intended merely as a grandfather
clause to protect only those systems in existence at the time. Thus, "[t]o be
encourages job offers that compel innocent workers to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has
only claimed, but not yet proven, unlawful discrimination." Id. at 3069-70.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, &
Plastic Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983), presented the Court with a conflict between the seniority
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and those set out in a conciliation agreement the
employer entered into with the EEOC to avoid Title VII liability. The liability would likely have
resulted from a pattern of hiring discrimination and the perpetuation of its effects through the
seniority system. The conciliation agreement suspended the bargained for reverse seniority layoff
practice in favor of recently hired females, and the union challenged the practice in an action filed
by the employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C, § 185 (1976).
Without reaching the question whether Title VII was implicated, see W.R. Grace & Co., 103 S. Ct.
at 2184 n.9, the Court ruled that the company could not voluntarily abrogate the collective bar-
gaining agreement without the union's consent.
102. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated, 103
S. Ct. 2076 (1983).
103. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
104. 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
105. Id. at 1542.
[Vol. 62
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION
cognizable, a claim that a seniority system has a discriminatory impact must
be accompanied by proof of a discriminatory purpose."' 10 6
In the dissenters' view, plaintiffs challenging a seniority system adopted
after the effective date of Title VII need only establish disparate impact in
order to prevail. 10 7 They read section 703(h) as an effort to protect the senior-
ity expectations of employees as they existedprior to the effective date of Title
VII, not those expectations that developed after that date.'0 8 Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissent in which he explained:
The Court in this case. . . reads the "specific intent" proviso of
§ 703(h) as though it were intended to define the proper standard for
measuring any challenge to a merit or seniority system. This reading
of the proviso is entirely unwarranted. The proviso is a limitation on
the scope of the affirmative defense. It addresses the problem created
by pre-Act seniority systems, which of course were "lawful" because
adopted before the Act became effective and therefore presumptively
"bona fide" within the meaning of § 703(h). As the legislative his-
tory makes clear, Congress sought to protect seniority rights that had
accrued before the effective date of the Act, but it did not want to
extend that protection to benefits under seniority systems that were
the product of deliberate racial discrimination. The obvious purpose
of the proviso was to place a limit on the protection given to pre-Act
seniority systems. The Court's broad reading of the proviso ignores
both its context in § 703(h) and the historical context in which it was
enacted. '0 9
Swint followed the "prior discrimination plus departmental seniority"
paradigm, although perhaps in an extreme form." 0 The district court con-
cluded that the seniority system did not reflect an intention to discriminate
because of race or color, and thus held that the system was protected under
section 703(h). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the differences did
result from intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
limited to the following questions:
[Wlhether a Court of Appeals is bound by the "clearly erroneous"
rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in reviewing a District
Court's findings of fact, arrived at after a lengthy trial as to the moti-
vation of the parties who negotiated a seniority system; and whether
the court below applied wrong legal criteria in determining the bona
106.' Id. at 1538.
107. Id. at 1542 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1543-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1548 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that applying the Griggs
standard to post-Act seniority systems, as he was suggesting, would not necessarily sound their
death knell, because systems with disparate impact may still by justified by a business necessity,
e.g., "the need to induce experienced employees to remain, to establish fair rules for advancement,
or to reward continuous, effective service." Id.
110. "Prior to 1965, the Company openly pursued a racially discriminatory policy of job as-
signments," with blacks steered into the worst departments and jobs. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1785. Of
the two unions at the plant, one had restricted itself to white members; the other had practiced
segregation in its meetings and social functions. Id. at 1786.
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fides of the seniority system." l
Answering both questions in the affirmative, the Court reversed and
remanded.
The Court in Swint reaffirmed its commitment to a motive-focused intent
standard for evaluating seniority challenges:
Differentials among employees that result from a seniority system are
not unlawful employment practices unless the product of an intent to
discriminate. It would make no sense, therefore, to say that the in-
tent to discriminate required by § 703(h) may be presumed from [dis-
criminatory] impact. As § 703(h) was construed in Teamsters, there
must be a finding of actual intent to discriminate on racial grounds
on the part of those who negotiated or maintained the system. That
finding appears to us to be a pure question of fact.
This is not to say that discriminatory impact is not part of the
evidence to be considered by the trial court in reaching a finding on
whether there was such a discriminatory intent as a factual matter.
We do assert, however, that under § 703(h) discriminatory intent is a
finding of fact to be made by the trial court; it is not a question of law
and not a mixed question of law and fact of the kind that in some
cases may allow an appellate court to review the facts to see if they
satisfy some legal concept of discriminatory intent. Discriminatory
intent here means actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be
drawn from a factual showing of something less than actual motive.
Thus, a court of appeals may only reverse a district court's finding on
discriminatory intent if it concludes that the finding is clearly errone-
ous under Rule 52(a). Insofar as the Fifth Circuit assumed other-
wise, it erred. 112
Intent would be assessed through application of factors employed in
James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co."13 and originally suggested in Team-
sters.1 14 First, does the system operate to equally discourage all employees
from transferring between seniority units? Second, is the departmental struc-
ture underlying the seniority system rational in light of the general industry
practice? Third, did the seniority system have its genesis in racial discrimina-
tion, (ie., what is the relationship between the system and other racially dis-
criminatory practices)? Finally, was the seniority system negotiated and
maintained free from any illegal purpose?115
Justice Marshall (joined by Justice Blackmun) filed a dissenting opinion,
taking issue with the majority's "proposition that section 703(h) of Title VII
immunizes a seniority system that perpetuates past discrimination, as the sys-
tem at issue here clearly does, simply because the plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate to this Court's satisfaction that the system was adopted or main-
111. Id. at 1783.
112. Id. at 1790-91 (footnotes omitted).
113. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
114. See supra text accompanying note 80.
115. James, 559 F.2d at 352.
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tained for an invidious purpose." 116 "[P]lacing such a burden on plaintiffs
who challenge seniority systems with admitted discriminatory impact, a bur-
den never before imposed in civil suits brought under Title VII, frustrates the
clearly expressed will of Congress and effectively 'freeze[s] an entire genera-
tion of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the
Act.' "117
In addressing the nature of "intent" required to successfully challenge a
seniority system, the dissenters read the majority opinion to hold "that a find-
ing of discriminatory intent sufficient to satisfy Teamsters can be based on
circumstantial evidence, including evidence of discriminatory impact.' 18
They concurred with the court of appeals that there was "overwhelming evi-
dence of discriminatory intent."' '19 The seniority system locked blacks into
the worst jobs, and this disproportionate impact contradicted any conclusion
that the system operated neutrally to discourage all employees, black and
white, from transferring to other departments-white employees would not
need to transfer since they already were in the choice jobs. No rational expla-
nation other than race explained the creation of segregated departments coin-
cident with unionization. Furthermore, "considerations of race permeated the
negotiation and adoption of the seniority system in 1941 and subsequent nego-
tiations thereafter."' 20
F Guardians Association-Extension of the Intent Requirement to Title VI
Seniority Challenges
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission 12 1 the Court ex-
tended the requirement of proof of discriminatory purpose to a seniority chal-
lenge brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,122 which has no
provision like section 703(h). The case involved a last hired-first fired layoff
practice in the New York City Police Department. The original violation,
found by the trial court years earlier, was the use of entry-level written exami-
nations from 1968 to 1970 that had a discriminatory impact and were not job-
116. Swint, 102 S. Ct. at 1793 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505,
516 (E.D. Va. 1968)).
118. Id. at 1795 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 1797 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1798 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525,
532 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982)).
121. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
122. The operative provision of this title provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any. program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
The § 703(h) standard has also been read into other civil rights laws as well. See Freeman v.
Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (§ 1981); United States v. Trucking Manage-
ment Co., 662 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Executive Order 11,246); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.,
516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951, on remand 559 F.2d 282 (5th
Cir. 1977) (same).
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related. Since appointments through 1974 were made in order of test score,
minorities tended to be hired later than whites, and thus had less seniority.
When the Department began layoffs in 1975, in reverse seniority order, minor-
ity officers filed another action and claimed this practice perpetuated the past
discrimination. 123
The challenge was premised primarily on Titles VI and VII, the former
based on the distribution of federal funds to the Department. The district
court, although finding no discriminatory intent behind the seniority practice,
ruled in favor of plaintiffs.' 2 4 The court reached only the Title VI claim, 125
and entered its decision before the Supreme Court's decision in Teamsters.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded after Team-
sters.126 On remand the district court ruled that Teamsters required it to mod-
ify its order since pre-Act (here pre-1972, the date the Act was applied to
municipalities) discrimination perpetuated by a seniority system was immu-
nized by section 703(h). 127 Officers hired prior to 1972 were thus not entitled
to relief, and officers hired after that date could not be awarded constructive
seniority going back before 1972. The court then looked to the Title VI claim,
that statute having been applicable to municipalities since 1964, and held that
proof of discriminatory intent was not necessary to establish a violation of
Title VI. The trial court thus ordered a class-wide constructive seniority rem-
edy for all minorities without regard to their date of hire.' 28 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the modified Title VII relief, but reversed the Title VI
decision, 129 holding that the district court had erred in concluding that Title
VI does not require proof of discriminatory intent.
On a writ of certiorari raising the question whether proof of discrimina-
tory intent is necessary to establish a Title VI violation, the Supreme Court
affirmed.1 30 Writing for the plurality, Justice White concluded that "Title VI
reaches unintentional, disparate impact discrimination as well as deliberate
racial discrimination."'131 Yet he voted to affirm the Second Circuit's decision
because he believed that without proof of discriminatory purpose, a plaintiffs
remedies under Title VI are limited to prospective relief (injunctive and de-
claratory) and cannot include retroactive compensatory relief such as back pay
or constructive seniority. In a footnote Justice White wrote:
123. 431 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (for re-
consideration in light of Teamsters), modified on remand, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aj'd
and mod#led in part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
124. Id. at 550-51.
125. The district court deemed it unnecessary to reach the Title VII claim. Id. at 530 n.2.
126. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977), mod/foedon remand,
466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a7d and modified inpart, rev'dinpart, 633 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
127. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afi'd and
modled inpart, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1980), af/'d, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
128. Id. at 1287.
129. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 228-69 (2d Cir. 1980), a/i'd, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
130. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
131. Id. at 3227.
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It is not uncommon in the law for the extent of a defendant's
liability to turn on the extent of his knowledge or culpability. Thus,
it has been said that, under principles of contract law, a contracting
party cannot be held liable for extraordinary harm due to special
circumstances unless, at the time the contract was made, he knew or
had reason to know the circumstances that made such extraordinary
injury probable "so as to have the opportunity of judging for himself
as to the degree of this probability." And in tort law, usually only
persons who have intentionally or recklessly violated another's rights
are liable for punitive damages. 132
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that "proof of discrimi-
natory animus should not be required" in a Title VI action, 133 but went fur-
ther than White by contending that compensatory relief (including retroactive
seniority) could be awarded in the absence of such proof.
[G]iven the need for an objective and administrable standard
applicable to thousands of federal grants under Title VI, the "effects"
test is far more practical than a test that focuses on the motive of the
recipient, which is typically very difficult to determine. 134
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun) concluded that Title VI requires a showing of invidious pur-
pose, but that regulations promulgated pursuant to it that prohibited impact as
well as intentional discrimination were nevertheless valid because they were
not inconsistent with the Act's delegation of enforcement authority to federal
agencies. As the dissent put it, "[A]lthough the Court has determined that
Title VI does not compel the application of an effects standard, I do not believe
that Congress should be understood to haveprohibited regulations adopting
such a standard."' 35
At first blush, Guardians Association seems to bring the status of seniority
challenges under Title VI into precise conformity with the status of such chal-
lenges under Title VII: an intent rather than a mere effects showing is neces-
sary to make out a case. Indeed, as Justice Powell reports, although "the
Court is divided as to the standard of proof required to prove violations of
132. Id. at 3230 n.20 (citations omitted) (quoting 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1014 (2d
ed. 1964)). Only Justice Rehnquist joined in this opinion. He agreed that plaintiffs were not
entitled to seniority relief, but disagreed with Justice White that a violation of Title VI could be
made without proof of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 3337.
Justice Powell filed a separate concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined. They
asserted that there is no private right of action under Title VI. Alternatively, they would have
affirmed on the grounds that a showing of intentional discrimination "is a prerequisite to a suc-
cessful Title VI claim." Id. at 3235-37 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor also filed a separate concurring opinion, concluding that proof of pur-
poseful discrimination is a necessary element of a valid Title VI claim. Id. at 3237-39 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
133. Id. at 3239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 3243 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Marshall noted that in 1966 the
House of Representatives rejected an amendment to limit Title VII's prohibition to intentional
discrimination, and the same amendment died in a Senate Committee. Id. at 3241-42 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
135. Id at 3255 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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rights in cases involving Title VI," nevertheless "[s]even members of the Court
agree that a violation of the statute itself requires proof of discriminatory
intent."136
This agreement is illusory. Three of the seven members (Stevens, Bren-
nan, and Blackmun) would hold that a violation of the regulations adopted
pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact.
These three justices, together with Justices White and Marshall, who conclude
that a violation of the statute itself requires only a showing of disparate im-
pact,/comprise a majority that "would hold that proof of discriminatory effect
suffices to establish liability. . . when the suit is brought to enforce the regula-
tion rather than the statute itself."'137 Since every federal department is
obliged to promulgate such regulations, and since these regulations uniformly
proscribe impact discrimination (at least at present), this majority would seem
to be critical for future decisionmaking. But even this breakdown is deceiving.
Because Justice White would not permit an award of compensatory relief
(which he defines to include constructive seniority as well as back pay) without
a showing of discriminatory purpose, impact discrimination merely entitles the
plaintiffs to prospective relief.138
It appears, then, that a 5-4 majority of the Court would oppose an award
of individual constructive seniority in a Title VI challenge unless discrimina-
tory purpose is established. Prospective injunctive and declaratory relief
could, however, be awarded on a mere showing of disparate impact. It re-
mains unclear whether this could include an injunction prospectively restruc-
turing the seniority system, but that seems a distinct possibility.
Such systemic injunctive relief would be unavailable in a Title VII action
without a showing of discriminatory purpose. 139 Oddly enough, the Title VII
plaintiff (unlike his Title VI counterpart) would be able to obtain constructive
seniority merely on a showing of unintentional perpetuation of post-Act
discrimination. 140
In fact, Guardians Association seems to present the anomolous situation
that the relief available is significantly different in identical seniority chal-
lenges under Title VI and Title VII,14 1 when proof of discriminatory motive is
lacking. Indeed, the respective remedies are mirror images of one another. If
136. Id at 3235 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
138. Indeed, Justice Powell did not exaggerate when he wrote: "Our opinions today will fur-
ther confuse rather than guide." Id. at 3235 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. See supra notes 78-120 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
141. The Supreme Court has adopted a broad definition of "seniority system" for the purpose
of§ 703(h). The majority in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980), unwilling to
restrict § 703(h)'s protection to rules relating merely to continuous length of service, held that a
clause in the industry collective bargaining agreement that required a temporary employee to
work at least 45 weeks in a single calendar year before becoming a permanent employee (and thus
be accorded greater seniority benefits and layoff protection) was a "seniority system." Id. at 610-
11. Thus, plaintifrs Quarles-type contention that the 45 week rule was perpetuating past discrimi-
nation by the employers and unions was deemed insufficient under Title VII. Id. at 605, 610-11.
The Court remanded with instructions to determine whether the 45 week rule was "bona fide" or
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nothing else emerges clearly from the blizzard of opinions in Guardians Associ-
ation, it is apparent that the Justices continue to disagree significantly over the
wisdom of applying a motive-centered standard to seniority challenges. 142
whether the differences in employment conditions that it produced were "the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race" under § 703(h). Id. at 610-11.
The Bryant majority rejected the court of appeals' view that the 45 week rule "lacks the
fundamental component of [a seniority] system," which is "the concept that employment rights
should increase as the length of an employee's service increases." Id. at 604. The appellate court
had pointed out that under the 45 week rule one employee could acquire permanent status after a
total of only 45 weeks work, as long as they are in the same calendar year, while another employee
could work for years and never attain permanent status because he never worked 45 weeks in any
one year. Id.
The Supreme Court wrote that, in enacting § 703(h), "Congress in 1964 quite evidently in-
tended to exempt from the normal operation of Title VII more than simply those components of
any particular seniority scheme that, viewed in isolation, embody or effectuate the principle that
length of employment will be rewarded. In order for any seniority system to operate at all, it has
to contain ancillary rules that accomplish certain necessary functions, but which may not them-
selves be directly related to length of employment." Id. at 607. The 45 week provision, which
prescribed "when the seniority time clock begins ticking," was one such rule. Id.
The decision in Bryant may insulate a wide range of employment decisions not typically
thought to involve "seniority systems" from an impact discrimination challenge. See generally
Zimmer, supra note 42, at 91-99.
142. This may in part explain the Court's refusal to decide Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983), in which the
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order suspending the statutorily mandated reverse
seniority practice controlling the major reduction-in-force proposed for the Boston police and fire
departments in 1981. A decade earlier, the courts had found these departments' hiring and testing
practices to be discriminatory in their effect and not job-related. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725
(1st Cir. 1972); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (Ist Cir. 1974). The federal
district court explicitly determined, however, that these were unintentional violations. Castro v.
Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 934, 944, 948 (D. Mass. 1971), alf'd in part, rev'dinpart, 459 F.2d 725,
727 (1st Cir. 1972); Boston Chapter, NAACP, v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 510, 514, 515, 519-20
(D. Mass.), aft'd, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 (lst Cir. 1974). The district court in Castro did find, how-
ever, that the exam was so woefully non-job-related that its "discriminatory consequences" were
"foreseeable by sophisticated persons." Castro, 334 F. Supp. at 943. The consent decrees entered
provided for a minority preferencein certification off civil service lists, and, by 1981, minority
representation in both departments increased dramatically, to 11.7% in the police department and
14.7% in the fire department. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 679 F.2d at 970. The layoffs proposed in
1981 would have cut these numbers approximately in half. Id.
The challenge to the proposed layoffs was premised on a perpetuation of past discrimination
theory; there was no showing that the seniority system itself was designed to harm minorities. The
court of appeals affirmed an order by the district court enjoining the departments from reducing
the percentage of minority officers through the layoff program; the employers could not implement
a last hired-first fired procedure. Id. at 968, 971, 978. Unlike the remedy approved in Franks, this
was not an individual plaintiff-by-plaintiff award of constructive seniority, requiring a hearing on
each claim. Rather, this represented systemic modification of the seniority system as it controlled
reductions-in-force. Indeed, the minority officers who benefited from this class-wide remedy in-
cluded persons who were not even themselves victims of the original discrimination-persons who
had not applied for their positions until years after the challenged examinations had been discon-
tinued. Id. at 976. The order, therefore, went significantly beyond the kind of seniority relief to
identifiable victims of post-Act discrimination that the Supreme Court had previously indicated
was permissible within the bounds of § 703(h).
The court of appeals premised its decision primarily on the inherent power of the district
court to revise its original remedial consent order, which established a minority preference, in
fight of Boston's unforeseen financial crisis. Id. at 971-73. It reviewed Franks, Teamsters, and
American Tobacco and found "nothing in this trilogy that precludes a court from ordering relief to
remedy discrimination that exists apart from the adoption or application of a bona fide seniority
system." Id. at 974. The court reached this conclusion despite its recognition that neither the
original hiring discrimination nor the seniority system itself were motivated by discriminatory
purpose, at least as reflected by the evidence of record. Id. at 971.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the police and firefighters unions' argument
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II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A MOTIVE-CENTERED STANDARD FOR
SENIORITY CHALLENGES
As developed in the previous section, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the ambiguous language and legislative history of Title VII to establish a mo-
tive-centered intent standard for classwide challenges to seniority systems that
adversely affect minority employees. This standard immunizes seniority-
based decisionmaking unless the court is satisfied that the system has been
adopted or maintained because of its discriminatory impact, and not merely in
spite of it. The intent requirement is applicable to systems set up both before
and after the effective date of the Act. The only room for judicial intervention,
short of a showing of discriminatory motive, is under the Franks doctrine-
that identifiable victims of post-Act discrimination can seek retroactive senior-
ity to the date they would have been hired or assigned but for the
discrimination.
This section explores the nature of this specific intent standard, which
departs from the effects test generally applicable in Title VII litigation.' 43
that "[a]n injunction against application of [the Massachusetts civil service reverse seniority stat-
ute] . . .could 'lie only if the requirement of § 703(h)-that such application be intentionally
discriminatory-were satisfied.'" Brief on the Merits for Petitioner Boston Firefighters Union,
Local 718 at 14-15, Boston Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983); see also Brief for the Peti-
tioner Boston Police Patrolmen's Association at 13-15, Boston Chapter, NA,4CP, 103 S. Ct. 2076
(1983); Brief for the State Petitioners at 55-60, Boston Chapter, NACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983).
After briefing and oral argument, however, the Court remanded the case for a determination of
possible mootness on the basis of a Massachusetts statute that provided for the reinstatement of all
officers laid off and granted them special seniority status which protected them from such lay offs
in the future. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983). On remand, the court
of appeals held the case was moot. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 716 F.2d 931 (Ist Cir.
1983).
The Court is presently considering a case that raises essentially identical issues as Beecher.
See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451
(1983).
143. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. Liability without fault is the rule for the
award of back pay under the statute as well. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (lack of evidence of bad faith is not permissible ground for denial of back pay award once
violation found).
Another area of Title VII litigation in which the impact theory also appears unavailable to
plaintiffs involves unequal pay claims. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)
(plaintiffs could pursue claim of "intentional" depression of their wages because of gender, but
implied that nonintentional claims were foreclosed).
Proof of specific intent to discriminate is not a necessary element to establish a violation of
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at
436-42; the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), see Cooper & Sobol, supra
note 17, at 1676 n.24; or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1981).
See also Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Note,
The Meaning of "Willful" Under the Liquidated Damages Provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 68 IowA L. REV. 333 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Meaning of "Will-
ful'; Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1982).
Such proof would only be relevant to the question of damages or the appropriate statute of limita-
tions. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 440; Note, The Meaning of "Wi4ful, "
supra. Nor is specific intent required to make out a violation of truth-in-lending or fair labelling
laws. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1676 n.24.
The situation is more complicated in National Labor Relations Act cases brought under
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), where the debate over motive versus impact continues. See
generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court
andthe Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory
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First, the standard is analyzed in comparison to standards controlling in cer-
tain other doctrinal areas to place it in a broader perspective. Second, the
lower courts' application of the intent requirement to seniority challenges is
studied. Last, the implications of the motive-centered inquiry, both from a
policy and a litigation standpoint, are considered.
A. A Comparative Perspective
The motive-centered intent requirement of Teamsters and its progeny ap-
pears to be the same standard applied in constitutional law discrimination
cases since Washington v. Davis, 144 but it represents a departure from notions
of intent in the tort area, to which the Supreme Court has frequently looked as
a model for civil rights case adjudication.' 45
Davis dealt with the validity of a written test given to police officer appli-
cants. Minorities challenged the exam as discriminatory under the equal pro-
tection clause; they established that a disproportionate number of blacks (four
times as many) as compared to whites failed the exam and that it had not been
validated as substantially related to job performance. There was no claim of
purposeful discrimination. The court of appeals applied a Griggs analysis and
ruled in favor of plaintiffs.' 46 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
proof of discriminatory purpose is a necessary element of a discrimination
claim brought under the Constitution.147 The Court added:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It
is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact. . . may
for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in
various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain
Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLAA, 66
GEO. LJ. 1109 (1978); Note, Collective Bargaining Over Plant Relocation Decisions: Let's Make a
Deal, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 715, 724 (1982).
144. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). This line of cases will only be summarized here. For a thorough
discussion, see Note, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 725 (1977). One writer has concluded that the Teamsters intent standard is identical to that
of Davis. See Schnapper, supra note 56, at 57 n.97.
145. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983); Briscoe v. LaHue, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1128
n.19 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Indeed the Court recently has advocated the incorporation of modem tort concepts into
§ 1983 case law. See Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 n.2 (1983). Quoting Cavey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978), the Wade Court observed:
"[O]ver the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement
the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the viola-
tion of his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequi-
sites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under
§ 1983 as well."
Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1629 n.2.
146. Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
147. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
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on nonracial grounds .... Disproportionate impact is not irrele-
vant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Constitution.1 48
The Supreme Court consistently has reaffirmed the Davis principle, re-
quiring a showing of discriminatory purpose in constitutionally based discrim-
ination cases.' 49 The Court, at the same time, has recognized that:
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a moti-
vating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available. 150
The "subjects of inquiry" on this question include: (1) the impact of the ac-
tion; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the sequence of events
leading up to the decision; (4) any departures from usual procedures; and (5)
any evidence of racially discriminatory intent. 151 Presumably other circum-
stantial evidence would include the absence of any legitimate interest served
by the decision and the availability of less discriminatory alternatives. 152
The decision in PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney153 is perhaps most sig-
nificant in this line of cases in terms of the seniority question. The practice
challenged was the statutory granting of an absolute veterans preference in the
appointment of civil service positions, a preference that operates "overwhelm-
ingly to the advantage of males."'154 Thus, in the better paying positions that
men would apply for, women were effectively excluded; they were relegated
instead to the lower paying positions that men were not interested in. Not
only was the adverse impact on women "severe,"' 155 it was also fully foresee-
148. Id. at 242. Concurring in the conclusion that discriminatory motive must be established,
Justice Stevens emphasized the important circumstantial role that proof of adverse impact should
still play:
Frequently, the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds.
Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (challenge to Memphis' closing of a
road connecting white area to predominantly black area,'which had an adverse effect on the black
neighborhood); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (challenge to an at-large election
system, which had effect of diluting black voting strength); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (challenge to the absolute veterans preference for civil service positions, which had
effect of limiting the consideration of females for civil service jobs); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (challenge to a Chicago suburb's refusal to grant a re-
quest to rezone certain property to permit multiple-family occupation, which had effect of
preventing minorities from living in the community). But see Rogers v. Lodge, 103 S. Ct. 3272
(1982), in which the Court sustained lower court findings based entirely on circumstantial evi-
dence that the county at-large system of elections was maintained for a discriminatory purpose.
This decision, while not overruling Bolden's requirement of discriminatory intent, seems to estab-
lish that such intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence.
150. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
151. Id. at 265-69.
152. See Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental4ctions.: .4 Motivation Theory ofthe Consti-
tutional Ban Against Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1097 (1978).
153. 442 U.S. 256 (1976).
154. Id. at 259. For an excellent discussion of the lower court and Supreme Court decisions in
Feeney, see Schnapper, supra note 56, at 31.
155. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 271.
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able prior to adoption of the policy and crystal clear during its years of opera-
tion. Moreover, the preference had little if any relevance to job performance.
Yet despite all of this, the Court in an opinion by Justice Stewart reversed the
decision below, which had invalidated the preference, and ruled against plain-
tiff because she had failed to establish "purposeful discrimination."'' 5 6
The Court relied on the district court's conclusion that the veterans pref-
erence "was not established for the purpose of discriminating against wo-
men."' 57 But the Court rejected the lower court's application of "the
presumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person intends the
natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions."' 58 Justice
Stewart explained:
[It] would . . . be disingenuous to say that the adverse conse-
quences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense
that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not fore-
seeable. "Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than in-
tent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies
that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or re-
affirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of,"
not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.' 59
The dissenters, Marshall and Brennan, found the preference to be "pur-
poseful gender-based discrimination," observing:
[S]ince reliable evidence of subjective intentions is seldom ob-
tainable, resort to inference based on objective factors is generally
unavoidable. To discern the purposes underlying facially neutral
policies, this Court has therefore considered the degree, inevitability,
and foreseeability of any disproportionate impact as well as the alter-
natives reasonably available. In the instant case, the impact of the
Massachusetts statute on women is undisputed. . . [The] absolute-
preference formula has rendered desirable state civil service employ-
ment an almost exclusively male prerogative. . . . [T]his conse-
quence follows foreseeably, indeed inexorably, from the long history
of policies severely limiting women's participation in the military.
Although neutral in form, the statute is anything but neutral in appli-
cation. . . .[Where] the foreseeable impact of a facially neutral pol-
icy is so disproportionate, the burden should rest on the State to
establish that sex-based considerations played no part in the choice
of the particular legislative scheme.' 60
The implications of the Feeney definition of discriminatory intent for sen-
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id. at 274.
158. Id. at 278. This is a presumption the Court has adopted in other civil rights cases. See,
e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (constitutional claims "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
acts").
159. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79 (footnotes and citations omitted).
160. Id. at 283-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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iority challenges is clear. In the typical case, the employer and union adopt or
maintain a seniority system after years of excluding minorities from certain
jobs. The foreseeable, indeed inevitable, effect is that minorities always will be
disadvantaged in decisions regarding promotion, layoff, and recall because
they were not allowed to accrue seniority along with their white coworkers
during the period of discrimination. Maintenance of the system guarantees
this result. Yet, under Feeney, it cannot be said that the employer and union
"intended" this result without proof of actual discriminatory purpose, proof
that is rarely available. This view of intent has prevailed in the Supreme
Court's seniority cases.' 6 t
The notion of intent as "motive" and "purpose" represents a rejection of
the traditional view of intent that prevails in the tort area, in which the term
generally is defined without regard to the actor's motive or underlying pur-
pose, but is used merely to distinguish conduct that is deliberate and volitional
from conduct that is accidental.' 62 Moreover, as the Court recognized in Fee-
ney, tort intent encompasses not only those consequences that the actor actu-
ally desired, but also those which a reasonable person would believe are
substantially certain to follow from the act.' 63 Thus tort law has objectified
161. See supra notes 78-120 and accompanying text.
162. Thus Prosser explains:
The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or
a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade
the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction. The defendant may be
liable although he has meant nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or has
honestly believed that he would not injure the plaintiff, or even where he was seeking the
plaintiff's own good.
To result in liability, the defendant's act must be a voluntary one. But a voluntary
act, reduced to its lowest terms, is a contraction of the muscles, and nothing else. The
movement of the finger which fires a gun is the same, whether it takes place in a crowded
city, or in the solitude of the Mojave Desert. Its legal character must depend upon the
actor's surroundings, and his state of mind with respect to them. His state of mind may
involve many things: he may intend to move his finger, for the purpose of pulling the
trigger, for the purpose of causing the bullet to strike a man, for the purpose of killing the
man, for the purpose of revenge, of defending his country, or of protecting himself
against attack. "Intent" is the word commonly used to describe the desire to bring about
the physical consequences, up to and including the death; the more remote objective
which inspires the act is called "motive." The one is merely a step less removed from the
muscular contraction than the other. Each has its own importance in the law of torts,
and a justifiable motive, such as that of self-defense, may avoid liability for the intent to
kill.
W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971).
163. Intent, however, is broader than a desire to bring about physical results. It must
extend not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the
actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what he does. An anarchist who
throws a bomb into the royal carriage may actually wish to kill no one but the king; but
since he knows that the death of others in the carriage is a necessary and almost inevita-
ble incident to that end, and nevertheless goes ahead with the deed, it must be said that
he intends to kill them. The man who fires a bullet into a dense crowd may fervently
pray that he will hit no one, but since he must believe and know that he cannot avoid
doing so, he intends it. The practical application of this principle has meant that where a
reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a particular result was
substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with by the jury, or even by the court, as
though he had intended it. The driver who whips up his horses with a loud yell while
passing a neighbor's team will not be credited when he denies that he intended to cause a
runaway; and the defendant on a bicycle who rides down a man in full view on a side-
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the requisite state of mind for its intentional wrongs, permitting it to be in-
ferred from the circumstances of the act and thus avoiding the subjective ques-
tion of actual state of mind. 164
If, for example, A voluntarily points a loaded gun at B and pulls the
trigger, striking him, A has "intentionally" shot B regardless of his underlying
motive and regardless of whether he really did not intend to hit B. Motive
would come into play only in certain limited circumstances, such as to estab-
lish the privilege of self-defense, or to determine whether punitive damages
should be awarded. That.A's act was volitional and likely to cause injury is all
that is necessary to make this an "intentional" tort. 165
Illustrative of the common-law separation of motive and intent in estab-
lishing liability is Truck Insurance Exchange v. Pickering.166 The issue here,
whether defendant's automobile insurance policy excluded coverage of the in-
cident, turned on whether defendant had "intended" to cause the fatal injuries
incurred by a third person whom he had struck with his pickup truck. De-
fendant asserted that he did not mean to injure the victim but instead was
merely trying to leave the scene of an earlier minor accident that had
threatened to explode into a melee. It was determined at trial that defendant
was aware of the presence of the victim near the path of his pickup when he
sped off. The court rejected the invitation to investigate defendant's purpose
at the time of the incident by noting that "[w]hen an intentional act results in
injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the act, the inju-
walk where there is ample room to pass may find the court unwilling to accept his state-
ment that he did not mean to do it.
Id. at 31-32. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965):
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject [Torts] to denote
that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the conse-
quences are substantially certain to result from it .... Intent is not, however, limited to
consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain or
substantially certain to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as
if he had in fact desired to produce the result.
J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW 198 (1982) ("Intent. . .includes consequences of conduct which
the actor knows may result, regardless of his purpose. . . .Actual intent is impossible of proof by
direct evidence except in rare situations. Triers of fact make that determination from surrounding
circumstances."); Epstein, supra note 65, at 166.
164. This "intent as volition" standard is the one applied by the courts that have interpreted
the "intent" clauses of Title VII other than the seniority proviso. See supra notes 31-36.
In a recent case involving the propriety of a punitive damage award in a § 1983 action, the
Supreme Court similarly followed the tort lead in rejecting the contention that such an award can
only be made upon a showing of evil motive or actual intent to inflict harm. See Smith v. Wade,
103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983). The Court emphasized the "quite distinct concepts of intent to cause in-
jury, on one hand, and subjective consciousness of risk of injury (or of unlawfulness) on the other,"
id. at 1630 n.6, observing that "[c]onsciousness of consequences or of wrongdoing, of course, does
not require injurious intent or motive; it is equally consistent with indifference toward or disregard
for consequences." Id. Thus, "indifference to consequences" rather than "intent to cause conse-
quences" is sufficient to support an award of punative damages. Id, at 1633 n.10.
165. See, e.g., Makovicka v. Lukes, 182 Neb. 168, 153 N.W.2d 733 (1967). In Makovicka de-
fendant and plaintiff were good friends. While horseplaying, the former picked up the latter in his
arms, carried her outside the house, lost his balance, and the fall injured her. Despite defendant's
testimony that he had no intent to injure his friend, and no malicious purpose, the court held that
a tort action was properly brought.
166. 642 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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ties as well as the act are intentional."' 67 The court explained:
Probing one's state of mind is an elusive task at best. Sup-
planting an objective standard with a subjective standard for deter-
mining whether the act or conduct. . . is "intentional" . . . would
emasculate apposite [insurance] policy provisions by making it im-
possible to preclude coverage for intentional acts or conduct absent
admissions by insureds of a specific intent to harm or injure. Human
nature augers against any viable expectation of such admissions. 168
The tort literature is not entirely lacking in suggestions that a motive ele-
ment does or should play a role in establishing liability. 169 Prosser seems to
support consideration of motive in certain torts, like nuisance and interference
with economic relations, in which the reasonableness of defendant's interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's rights may depend on the former's reasons for act-
ing.170 Motive may also play a part in claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as well as in the qualified privilege defense in actions for
alienation of affections, malicious prosecution, and defamation. 17 In the for-
mer case, for example, the courts usually have required a showing that the
defendant specifically intended to cause emotional distress, or at least acted in
conscious disregard of a high probability of such harm.' 72
167. Id. at 116.
168. Id. See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1982), in which suit was brought to recover damages for contamination of oil reserves by the
defendant's injection of hazardous chemicals into plaintiffs pipeline. Defendant argued that it
lacked the requisite "intent" required for liability because the reason for injecting the chemicals
was to save time and money, and not to harm plaintiff's supplies. The court, concluding that
defendant's use of the chemicals created a likely risk of damage to plaintiff's oil, rejected the
assertion that defendant's good motive was relevant. It held that it was not "necessary. . . to find
that [defendant] harbored a hostile intent, or desired to do any harm in order to hold that [defend-
ant] committed an intentional tort." Id. at 1309. Similarly, although "intent to deceive" is
deemed an element of an action for fraud, intent is usually defined simply as conduct which is not
inadvertent, regardless of motive or purpose. See Cohan, The Rights and Duties of Retail
Merchants Under State Consumer Protection Laws: Emergent Doctrines and Strategies of the De-
fense, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 297, 312 (1983).
169. See, e.g., Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort, Because of the Wrongful Motive of an
Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411 (1975); Lawrence, Motive as an Element in Tort, 12 ME. L. REV. 47
(1919). Professor Lawrence argued that the human act can never be understood apart from its
purpose, and he proposed that "[t]he door should be thrown wide open for evidence revealing the
true nature, character, object and purpose of all human acts resulting in injury to others." Id at
55-56. Lawrence cautioned, however, of the impracticality of an inquiry into motive and thus
concluded that "while. . . evidence indicative of mental conditions may be received, it should not
be forgotten that thefactumprobandum is the character of human action, and not a photograph of
the human brain, mind, or heart." Id. The primary thrust of much of what the motive proponents
suggest is that otherwise lawful conduct done with a malicious motive should be actionable, which
is of course the flip side of the coin from the seniority question-can conduct with harmful results
be redeemed by good motive?
170. W. PROSSER, supra note 162, at 23-26.
171. W. PROSSER, supra note 162, at 23-26. See also Seavey, Bad Motive Plus Harm Equals a
Tort, 26 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 279 (1952).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47 (1965).
Even in actions in which "malice" has to be established, however, the term has been given "a
broad spectrum of meanings." See Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 n.8 (1983). While at
times it has been interpreted to require a showing of ill will, spite, or intent to injure, it has often
been used to mean that the "tort resulted from a voluntary act, even if no harm was intended."
Id. In still other cases it has been defined as "an intent to do the act that caused the injury, as
opposed to the intent to cause the injury itself." Id.
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It would appear, however, that motive is likely to be weighed in the liabil-
ity determination only when the courts are wary of a particular type of claim,
such as the emotional distress cause of action. As Prosser has observed, when
through the passage of time and "with the approval of custom and public
opinion, the rights and privileges of the parties in particular situations have
become crystallized, standardized, definite, or 'absolute,'" then "the law looks
at them with a purely objective view" and motive inquiries generally become
irrelevant.' 73 The majority of courts, in other words, have refused to travel
into the immensely intricate domain of human motivation to determine inten-
tional tort liability.
Nor does motive play a significant role in the other major area of fault
liability, negligence. Just as the law of intentional torts establishes an objec-
tive state of mind standard by presuming that the actor intends the normal
consequences of his conduct, the law of negligence judges conduct by the stan-
dard of reasonableness.' 74 Liability for negligence is founded on defendant's
actual or constructive (what he should have known) knowledge that there is a
probable risk of injury to the others. What characterizes an act of negligence
is that there is a risk of harmful consequences that is of a sufficient magnitude
that "the reasonable person" would anticipate them and take action to avoid
them.
As with intentional torts, the state of defendant's knowledge is to be dis-
tinguished from his motive and purpose. IfA4's conduct creates an unreasona-
ble risk of harm to others, he is liable for negligence even though his
underlying state of mind was one of great concern for the safety of others.175
Put another way, it is no defense to a negligence action that defendant's mo-
tive was to act in a careful way. Conversely, if defendant's conduct did not
create an unreasonable risk of harm, then defendant was not negligent even
though his state of mind might have been one of utmost carelessness. Thus the
doctrine of negligence generally permits recovery for unintended but foresee-
able harm, without regard to defendant's motive underlying the conduct. De-
fendant's conduct is blameworthy only in the sense of creating an
unreasonable risk of such harm. 176
173. W. PROSSER, supra note 162, at 24-25.
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
175. Similarly, with regard to the tort standard of conduct defined as "wilful and wanton," it
is not the underlying purpose of the actor that is in question but instead the knowledge, either
actual or constructive, that the actor had of the degree of risk involved in his conduct. See id.
§§ 500-503; Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 n.8 (1983) ("Wanton" conduct includes action
taken with actual or constructive knowledge of the likely harm; "willfulness" means only volun-
tary action, not intent to cause injury.). For a comparison of the degree of "willfulness" required
in parallel statutes creating criminal and civil liability (e.g., FLSA, Truth-in-Lending, Fair Label-
ling), see Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1676 & nn.24-26.
176. As Prosser wrote: "It is now more or less generally recognized that the 'fault' upon which
liability may rest is social fault, which may but does not necessarily coincide with personal immo-
rality." W. PROSSER, supra note 162, at 18.
Indeed, the economic theorists would have us believe that our system uses "fault" as a short-
hand term for market deterrence, along the lines originally suggested by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947), by weighing the cost of
preventing the accident against the probability of its occuring and the magnitude of the loss if it
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Under the objective view of conduct generally prevailing in tort doctrine,
the adoption and maintenance of a seniority system in the face of the foresee-
able risk that it will harm minority employees because of past discrimination
at that shop would constitute at least negligent, and perhaps intentional, con-
duct. Certainly after the system has been operating and producing disparate
results, the conduct would be considered "intentional,"'177 and at least one
court has so held. 78 The Swint definition of intent thus represents a concept
occurs. Thus if the cost of safety measures exceeds the economic benefit in accident prevention,
the tort system does not hold the actor liable. If, however, the benefit of accident prevention
exceeds the costs, the negligence doctrine is applied to make the actor liable "in the expectation
that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judg-
ments." Posner, 4 Theory of Negligence, supra note 65, at 33. See also Demsetz, When Does the
Rule of Liabiiiy Matter?, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 13, 28 (1972) ("The use of words such as 'blame,'
'responsible,' and 'fault' must be treated with care by the economist because they have no useful
meanings in an economic analysis of these problems other than as synonyms for the party who
could have most easily avoided the costly interaction."). For an economic analysis of liability for
intentional torts, see Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. LAW & EcoN.
201 (1971). For a critique of the economic theorists from a socialist perspective, see Abel, Torts, in
D. KAIRYs, THE POLITICS OF LAW 185 (1983) [hereinafter cited as POLITICS].
177. Suggestions regarding this analysis of liability appear in the earliest scholarly work on
Title VII. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1653:
As soon as an employer is, or should reasonably be, on notice that a test is not
predictive of job performance and is disproportionately screening out blacks, the dis-
crimination that results can realistically be interpreted as "intended." Intent, under this
interpretation, is not frozen at the time a test is adopted, but rather continues to evolve as
the context of test use changes. Moreover, any test causing this result is being "used" to
discriminate, whether or not so intended.
See also Rachlin, supra note 17, at 482:
(a) "result of an intention" [as used in § 703 (h)] means that a currently bad result vio-
lates the statute regardless of the fact that the intention existed before the act, or (b) one
has a current intent to do wrong if one is aware that the result of one's previous acts is a
present discriminatory effect.
Recently Eric Schnapper, criticizing Teamsters, concluded that a system which perpetuates past
discrimination, known to those who adopt and maintain the system, should be violative of Title
VII. See Schnapper, supra note 56, at 57-58.
Writers have made the same observation with regard to legislative motivation and the Wash-
ington v. Davis standard. See Simon, supra note 152, at 1126-27 (If a law is enacted for a proper
purpose but turns out to have disparate effect, failure to repeal the law is suspect, since the legisla-
ture now knows what it is doing. Similarly, the failure of the defendants to change their testing
procedure in Washington v. Davis, once the substantial discriminatory impact was known, should
entitle the plaintiffs to prospective relief.). Several civil rights cases have turned on the defend-
ant's knowledge of the impact of its actions. See Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 722 (7th Cir.
1979) (school board's knowledge through available statistical data that decisions had racially seg-
regative effect); De la Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 58 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendants' knowledge that
by failing to revise their policies they were contributing to discriminatory employment results);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1978) (school board's knowledge of segregative
impact of its policies); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1977) (school
board's decision to rescind integration plan made with full knowledge that rescision would return
black children to resegregated schools).
In other statutory contexts, knowledge that a discriminatory situation is likely to occur, or is
occurring, can give rise to additional damages being assessed against the employer. See B. SCHLPI
& P. GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 440 (Equal Pay Act).
178. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 937 (5th Cir.) ("A failure to show
conscious intent to discriminate does not preclude a finding of discriminatory purpose. ... Both
the union and the company were found to have been aware of the discriminatory impact of the
seniority system. In view of this awareness, . . . the seniority system here was the result of pur-
poseful discrimination."), rev'd and remanded, 456 U.S. 952 (for reconsideration in light of Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)), decision on remand, 695 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1983).
This case is discussed infra notes 206-I1.
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unlike that prevailing in tort doctrine.
It appears that the motive-centered intent requirement applied by the
court in seniority challenges is more akin to a concept found in the criminal
law.179 Crimes generally require a certain state of mind, or mens rea, before
they can be established.180 Under traditional terminology, most crimes re-
quire only a showing of "general intent," analogous to the tort notion of delib-
erate conduct with knowledge or constructive knowledge of the likely
consequences. Other crimes, however, require "specific intent," which is an
additional intention to cause a specific consequence. Examples of the latter
would include assault with intent to kill and treason, which requires an intent
to aid the enemy. The Model Penal Code has adopted another approach and
defines instead four different mental states applicable to elements of crimes:
"purposely" (the actor consciously desires his conduct to cause a particular
result); "knowingly" (the actor is aware that his conduct is practically certain
to cause a particular result); "recklessly" (the actor is aware of a risk that his
conduct might cause a particular result); and "negligently" (the actor should
be aware of a risk that his conduct might cause a particular result). 18 ' The
S;vint standard most closely resembles the requirements that the defendant act
with specific intent or purposely.' 8 2 These represent the highest levels of state
of mind proof required on the criminal side.' 83 Crimes requiring that the de-
fendant act "knowingly," "recklessly," or "negligently" do not necessitate a
finding of conscious intent to cause the particular result, but merely a degree
of awareness that such result is likely.' 84 These mental states apparently
179. When arguing in support of a similar purposeful intent standard for the renewal of the
Voting Rights Act, Senator Orrin Hatch analogized it to the criminal law standard. See The
MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Transcript # 1658, at 4 (Feb. 3, 1982) ("[iWith regard to the intent test,
we prove intent everyday. In every criminal case in this country beyond a reasonable doubt.").
This analogy ignores the material difference between a criminal prosecution and civil litigation,
differences in the underlying purposes of the laws in question as well as in the nature of the
roceedings. Perhaps most obviously, the burden of proof on the prosecution is considerably
igher than that on the plaintiff, and that "reflects society's desire not to deprive a defendant of his
liberty or subject him to community opprobrium without extremely reliable proof of guilt; it also
reflects a desire to protect the individual against the litigational advantages the state enjoys in
prosecuting him." See Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of
Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 117 (1983).
180. See generally W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, HANKBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 195-208 (1972);
R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 739-764 (2d ed. 1969); Cook,Act, Intention andMotive in
the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917); Duff, Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission
Report, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. (1980); Perkins, supra note 65; Note, Motive as an EssentialElement of
Crime, 35 DICK. L. REv. 105 (1931). In a recent essay, however, Professor Perkins identifies (and
sharply criticizes) "an increasing reliance on notions of strict liability and its concomitant punish-
ment without fault." See Perkins, A Rationale Criminal Liability Without Fault: 4 Disquieting
Trend, 68 IowA L. REv. 1067, 1068 (1983).
181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft 1955).
182. A recent student note makes a similar comparison between the intent standard of Wash-
ington v. Davis and the concept of mens rea in criminal law. See Note, spra note 179, at 111.
183. In other words, the Court has read Title VII as if it were a criminal statute providing: It
shall be a violation of the law for an employer or labor organization to adopt and maintain a
seniority system that perpetuates the effects of the employer's past discrimination, but only if the
defendant acted purposely and with the specific intent to cause such a discriminatory result.
184. The Supreme Court has noted that historically "even crimes of intent commonly required
only intent to do the criminal act (and, in some cases, knowledge that the injury would likely
follow), rather than actual ill will or purpose to inflict an injury." Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625,
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would not satisfy the Swint intent requirement.
The significance of this capsule view of the tort and criminal law is to
suggest that, as a comparative matter, the intent requirement set down by the
court for seniority challenges is by no means commonly found in the law. The
1632 n.9 (1983) (citations omitted). "Motive," as distinguished from "intent," is a term "which has
caused the [criminal law] theorists considerable difficulty for years." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 180, at 204. Perkins has written:
The difference between intent and motive may be emphasized by illustration. If one
man has caused the death of another by a pistol shot, his intent may have been any one
of an almost infinite number, such as to kill the deceased, to frighten the deceased by
shooting near him without hitting him, or to intimidate the deceased by pointing the
weapon at him without shooting. If in the particular case the intent was to kill the de-
ceased, the motive of the shooter may also have been one or more of a number of possi-
ble motives, such as, hatred, revenge, jealousy, avarice, fear, or even love.
Perkins, supra note 65, at 921.
While it is often said that motive is irrelevant to the establishment of an offense, this in fact
seems somewhat misleading. First, "specific intent" crimes involve proof of the reasons behind
the act in the sense that the actor must be shown to have intended the specific result. Second,
crimes like burglary have an element that goes to the defendant's purpose, such as breaking and
entering for the purpose of committing a felony. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 180, at
204.
It is true, however, that if motive is defined as the underlying reason for the actor's conduct,
then it is irrelevant to the question of criminal liability. Thus, if one burglar entered the dwelling
in order to get money to support a drug habit, and another in order to feed his children, that
underlying motivation makes no difference on the question of whether a crime had been commit-
ted. His motive would come into the case only as part of a circumstantial evidentiary showing
against the defendant in the absence of direct proof, and, of course, on the question of appropriate
sentence. See e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), in which Father
Phillip Berrigan and others were convicted of destruction of government property and interference
with the selective service system, to wit, pouring animal blood over government records. The
defendants argued that their action was motivated by a sincere belief that United States involve-
ment in the Vietnam War was immoral, and thus their conduct was not "willful" as required by
the statute. The court rejected this view, stating that "the defendants' motives, whatever motive
may have led them to do the act is not relevant to the question of the violation of the statute, but is
rather an element proper for the judge's consideration in sentencing." Id. at 1004. See also
United States v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974), in which defendant was convicted under a
federal statute which prohibited "willfully and knowingly" becoming involved in the transferring
of counterfeit currency. The defendant argued that he was acting in a private undercover effort to
apprehend the real culprits and thus lacked the requisite level of intent. The court rejected this,
holding that "[n]oble motives and pure thoughts cannot bar the conviction of one who admits
intentional action which violates the proscriptions of a statute declaring that action criminal." Id
at 1284.
Even for crimes in which "malice" is an element of the offense, it appears that proof of
motive is not necessary. Perkins, for example, discusses the crime of malicious mischief. He
notes:
Where the issue has been squarely presented the courts have tended to reject the notion
that any element of ill-will, grudge or spite is required for conviction of malicious mis-
chief. The malice in such cases is sometimes spoken of as "inferred or presumed." What
is really meant is that the mental element required for conviction and known to the law
as 'malice' requires no more than the intentional doing of the particular harm without
circumstances ofjustification, excuse or substantial mitigation. It is rather generally rec-
ognized that this is sufficient for malice in the commission of other crimes, such as black-
mail, false imprisonment, libel, malicious prosecution, mayhem or murder.
Perkins, supra note 65, at 916. This definition of malice appears similar to the Griggs standard:
causing disparate impact without the justification of job-relation or business necessity. See supra
notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
As in the tort experience, courts have been resistant to the use of motive in determining
criminal liability in large part because of the difficulty in uncovering the reasons behind human
action. Chief Justice Brian put it well: "[T]he thought of man shall not be tried for the devil
himself knoweth not the thought of man." Y.B. 7 Ed. IV. t.2, pl.2., quotedin Note, supra note 180.
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major focus in criminal and tort law remains on the socially harmful result,
not the reasons why the defendant decided to cause or risk that result.
. The Lower Courts' Application of the Intent Standard
To appreciate the real significance of a specific intent requirement in sen-
iority challenges, it is necessary to survey its application in the lower courts.
Some of the criteria that should inform our evaluation of the standard's opera-
tion are: (1) whether the standard provides a workable rule that courts can
employ to make reasoned distinctions between fact patterns; (2) whether the
standard guides the court and the parties preparing and conducting the litiga-
tion; and (3) whether the standard serves to further the policies of Title VII.
It is axiomatic that the Swint standard, focusing on purpose rather than
effect, introduces considerable complexity and uncertainty into the resolution
of seniority challenges. Swint illustrates this fact in the disagreement between
district and circuit courts over whether the same body of facts reflects discrimi-
natory purpose. A similar disagreement occurred in Terrell v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co. ,185 in which the failure to provide carry-over seniority
from previously segregated units had the effect of maintaining de facto segre-
gation for a decade after the enactment of Title VII.186 By 1983 the search for
the real purpose and intent underlying the seniority system had consumed
eleven years of litigation, only to result in a remand to the trial court for yet
another determination of defendant's motives.' 8 7 Although designed to bring
some uniformity into the area, the James factors'"8 for assessing the lawful-
ness of seniority systems under section 703(h) have proven highly malleable
and seem merely to rephrase the question rather than provide definitive
guidance. t8 9
In contrast to these cumbersome lawsuits searching for the state of mind
of the creators and maintainers of the seniority system, are those seniority
challenges in which section 703(h) was held inapplicable and thus motive in-
quiry was unnecessary. In Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railway,19 0 for
example, the court held that the defendant union had waived its section 703(h)
defense by not raising it in a timely manner. The case was thus treated under
the Griggs analysis: was there a showing of substantial adverse racial impact
and, if so, could it be justified by business necessity? The black plaintiffs had
185. 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2028, on remand, 696
F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1983).
186. An example of the effect of this system was noted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
the case of a black employee with 26 years on the job who took advantage of his newly-won right
to transfer to a better department. His transfer resulted in a loss of all seniority, and he was soon
laid off as part of a plant reduction. Two white workers with just a few years on the job, but in the
better department, kept their jobs. Id. at 1115.
187. Id. at 1135.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
189. See generally Kasold, Toward Defnition of the Bona Fide Seniority System, 35 U. FLA. L.
REv. 41 (1983). Kasold has demonstrated the significant inconsistencies in interpretation and
application of each factor among the circuit courts. See also infra note 211.
190. 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982).
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been hired as far back as the 1940s but were still in entry level positions as a
result of a combination of initial assignment and a seniority system (revised in
1968) which kept them in their original positions. With no need to make a
determination of the defendants' purpose and design the court was able in-
stead to explore the actual results of the practices and to weigh them against
the business interests they served.
Similarly, in People v. N YC Transit Authority 191 the New York Court of
Appeals interpreted the state civil rights law, which does not contain an excep-
tion like section 703(h), in the context of a seniority challenge. Until 1971 the
Transit Authority had prohibited females from taking the entry examination
for hire as bus drivers, and no female drivers were appointed until 1978. In
1981 the Authority announced that promotions would be made to dispatcher
(the first level of management) and that selection would be based on the candi-
dates' seniority in the driver position. Because of the prior exclusion, no wo-
man had more than three years seniority. Thus, all promotions would go to
men. The State Attorney General brought an action under the Human Rights
Act and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions al-
leging that the neutral seniority system perpetuated the past discrimination in
hiring. In the absence of a discriminatory purpose requirement, the court of
appeals applied a Griggs analysis to the state civil rights law claim,192 found
disparate impact, and remanded for a determination of the business necessity
question. Thus, the obvious impact of the seniority system in conjunction with
past practices was analyzed in terms of the results, not through speculation
about the purpose behind the results. Since the constitutional claims required
a showing of purpose and intent, however, the Court affirmed dismissal of
these claims for lack of the requisite allegations.
A survey of those few recent cases in which plaintiffs have sucessfully
challenged seniority systems under the section 703(h) intent standard reveal
that those plaintiffs generally have been able to establish demonstrable devia-
tions from routine operation of the system. In Payne v. Travenol Laboratories
Ine. ,193 for example, the employer's consideration of length of service as a
criterion for promotion was found to perpetuate past hiring discrimination.
Rejecting defendant's argument that this seniority factor was protected by sec-
tion 703(h), the Fifth Circuit wrote: "We see no application of Teamsters to
the instant case. Travenol's informal and erratic reliance on length of service
falls short of being a bona fide seniority system under the statute and under
Teamsters."194
Deviation from the normal operation of the system also impressed the
Fifth Circuit in Scarlett v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad,19 5 in which the court
191. 59 N.Y.2d 343, 452 N.E.2d 316, 465 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1983).
192. The Court reserved for later decision the question whether some provision like § 703(h)
should be read into the New York law. Id. at 350-51, 452 N.E.2d at 319-20, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 505-
06.
193. 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982).
194. Id. at 827.
195. 676 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1982).
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found "consistent disregard" of the neutral seniority provisions when they
would benefit the five black plaintiffs, permitting whites with less seniority to
be promoted over them, 196 and in Terrell v. United States Pipe and Foundary
Co., 197 in which a "racial swap" of positions between bargaining units permit-
ted the seniority system to operate in a disparate manner. In Wattleton v. In-
ternational Brotherhood of Boiler Makers,198 the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
favor of plaintiffs was based in large part on the finding that at various times
white employees had been permitted to transfer between units without loss of
seniority, but no black employee had ever been able to do so.19 9
In dismissing seniority challenges, the courts often have relied on plain-
tiffs' failure to produce evidence of significant deviations from the established
system. In Wright v. Olin Corp. 200 the evidence established that females had
been steered into the least desirable jobs and that the highest paying depart-
ments were predominantly male. The company responded that this resulted
from the operation of its seniority system, which controlled assignments, pro-
motion, and transfers. Noting that the "plaintiffs produced virtually no evi-
dence that Olin substantially deviated from the seniority method of assigning
jobs," 20 ' the court ruled the system bona fide and protected by section 703(h).
Similarly, in Taylor v. Mueller Co. 202 the departmental seniority system was
found to be perpetuating past discrimination by locking blacks into the lowest
paying jobs, but the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment for
the defendants, noting that there were no deviations from the strict use of sen-
iority to determine an employee's position. Moreover, "[t]he fact that the sen-
iority system was adopted at a time when Mueller practiced racial
discrimination in its employment practices does not establish that the system
had its genesis in racial discrimination." There was also insufficient evidence
to establish "that an intent to discriminate entered into the 'very adoption' of
the Mueller seniority system." 203
Many courts have thus seized upon the presence or absence of manipula-
tion in the seniority system as a key element in the section 703(h) analysis.
The courts, at times, seem to be reading the requirements that the system be
"bona fide" and that the results of its operation not reflect an "intention to
196. Id. at 1051-52.
197. 644 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1981).
198. 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1199 (1983).
199. Id at 588. The court also pointed to significant changes that were made in the seniority
system coincident with the hiring of blacks for the first time in 1948. See also Sears v. Atchison, T.
& S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365, 1374 (10th Cir. 1981) (system was maintained with a discriminatory
purpose because union had sought transfer of duties from black to white employees).
200. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
201. Id. at 1180. The removal of a black female from a bidding list and her replacement by a
male with less seniority who was subsequently given the job was not considered significant. See
id. at 1180 n.10.
202. 660 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1981).
203. Id. at 1123. See also Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (D.W. Va. 1982)
(seniority system that prevented women from working in janitorial department was permissible
because it had been adhered to consistently and had evolved "without either the [employer's] or
the Union's having had at any time whatever any inkling, intent or purpose that [the seniority
system]... would operate discriminatorily, much less unlawfully so").
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discriminate" as a single concept-as long as the system is left to run without
interference, it is neutral and therefore not the product of discriminatory mo-
tive. In view of the difficulty of determining the "purpose" behind the sys-
tem,204 it is not surprising that irregularities have come to the fore when
assessing both the bona fides of the seniority arrangements and the circum-
stantial evidence of unlawful motives.
Yet this emphasis is troublesome. Does the fact that the discriminatory
impact is arrived at through strict adherence to the established seniority sys-
tem always indicate that the employer and union lack discriminatory purpose,
or might it merely mean that the system is functioning so well in achieving
that purpose that no deviation is required? Conversely, does deviation from
the system in a way that happens to add to discriminatory impact always mask
invidious motive, or might it merely involve racially innocent patronage to
union favorites? In short, the criterion of regular operation may very well be
both under- and over-inclusive, netting the clumsy discriminator and at times
the racially neutral "old-boy" network, while letting pass the sophisticated dis-
criminator who sees to it that all "i's" are properly dotted. As such, although
this factor gives the litigants and the court something tangible on which to
focus, it is questionable whether it permits reasoned distinctions between fact
patterns, or serves the nondiscrimination goals of Title VII.
Plaintiffs faced with seniority systems that preserve a discriminatory sta-
tus quo but do so without departure from the rules are forced to seek "smok-
ing gun" evidence of discriminatory purpose, a quest that in the large majority
of cases will be futile.205 One of the rare cases in which plaintiffs successfully
have challenged the system in the absence of such proof is United States v.
Georgia Power Co. 2 06
In Georgia Power blacks had been steered into the lowest job classifica-
tions prior to 1963, and transfer was virtually impossible. After 1963 the no-
transfer practice was replaced by a unit seniority system. Although the white
units had lines of progression through which whites could advance without
loss of seniority, the black units had only one job; thus blacks could advance
only by transferring, and this meant complete loss of accumulated seniority.20 7
The district court held that the seniority system conformed to the require-
ments of section 703(h)-it was bona fide and not negotiated or maintained
204. See Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the court
candidly concedes this difficulty.
205. See, e.g., Freeman v. Motor Convoy, 700 F.2d 1339 (1th Cir. 1983) (after prevailing on
their seniority challenge in the district court prior to the Teamsters decision, plaintiffs lost on
remand because they had no proof of discriminatory purpose); Moore v. IATSE Local 659, 29
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 542 (D. Cal. 1982) (hiring roster listing candidates based on time spent
working in the film industry, although freezing the status quo of exclusion of females from indus-
try jobs, was permissible in absence of evidence that it was established or maintained for discrimi-
natory purpose); Afro-Am. Police League v. Fraternal Order of Police, 553 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. In.
1982) (complaint dismissed for failure to allege specific facts establishing intentional discrimina-
tion behind seniority system).
206. 634 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 456 U.S. 952 (1982), decision on
remand, 695 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1983).
207. Id. at 931.
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with a discriminatory purpose.20 8 The Fifth Circuit reversed and held the sys-
tem violated Title VII; the facial equality between whites and blacks was "but
a mask for the gross inequality beneath."20 9 The conspicuous lack of any lines
of progression within the black units exposed the real purpose of the seniority
system-it intentionally reinforced the purposefully-segregated job classifica-
tion scheme. The Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion in the face of the ex-
plicit finding below that there was "no showing of any conscious intent" to
discriminate with regard to the scheme of job seniority.2 10 The court ruled
that such "conscious intent" could be inferred from the facially disparate im-
pact and the lack of any non-racial explanation for it. The Court added:
Both the union and the company were found to have been aware
of the discriminatory impact of the seniority system. In view of this
awareness, the. . findings of the district court clearly show the sen-
iority system here was the result of purposeful discrimination.2 11
The Swint specific intent requirement has thus clearly switched the spot-
light in seniority litigation away from the effects of the system in the work-
place, and toward a search for clues of the purpose and design behind the
system. Even in such cases as Georgia Power, impact is deemed significant
only insofar as it is evidence of purpose. What remains to be explored is an
evaluation of this development from a policy perspective.
C Reflections on the Specofc Intent Standard in Seniority Challenges
The seniority system in the typical section 703(h) case is an integral part
of the glue that maintains a segregated workplace. Without a unit seniority
rule, past discrimination in hiring and assignments gradually would be un-
done as the incumbent victims accrue company seniority that permits them to
advance, and the previously rejected applicants are hired and permitted to
compete for positions for which they are qualified. Seniority, regardless of the
intention, inhibits this process and keeps minorities "in their place." Given the
broad assault on discrimination in the workplace that Title VII represents, the
208. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 649, 652 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd, 634
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 456 U.S. 952 (1982), decision on remand, 695 F.2d
890 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. Georgia Power, 634 F.2d at 935.
210. Id. at 937.
211. Id. Georgia Power, it must be emphasized, involved the complete segregation of blacks
into the lowest job classifications. Thus, the seniority system, by preventing transfer, worked to
the sole disadvantage of blacks. Compare International Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, dis-
cussed supra notes 78-9 1, in which the Supreme Court faced a departmental seniority scheme that
discouraged transfer from a unit occupied by both whites and minorities. The Court, although
recognizing that all minority applicants were discriminatorily steered into the lower unit, never-
theless found the seniority system neutral and bona fide because "drivers ... who are discour-
aged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to
the contrary, the overwhelming majority are white." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356.
See also Sears v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981) (system found in
violation of Title VII where the unit from which employees were discouraged from transferring
was all black). Contra Taylor v. Mueller, Co., 660 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir. 1981) ("IT]he fact that
the black employees were locked into lower job classifications than their white fellow employees is
not sufficient to deprive the system of its section 703(h) immunity.").
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section 703(h) intent standard has proven a formidible, often insurmountable,
obstacle to equal opportunity.
Does the Swint standard serve the legislative purpose behind section
703(h)? Given that Congress intended the seniority exception to preserve in
some way the expectations of "innocent" nonminority employees, 21 2 it is not
immediately apparent why expectations developed under a system whose dis-
parate impact on minorities cannot be shown to be "purposeful" are any more
deserving of preservation than those developed under a system in which a
court discerns such purpose. Both systems perpetuate a past regime of segre-
gation. Presumably the "innocence" of the white employees is constant in both
systems. 21 3 Yet "punishment," in the form of decreased seniority rights, is
meted out to white employees in one system but not the other because of an
after-the-fact determination that their union or employer designed the senior-
ity apparatus to disadvantage blacks, rather than merely maintained a system
which had that forseeable, often inevitable, effect. The Supreme Court
seemed to anticipate this anomaly when it wrote in Franks that "the impact of
rightful place seniority upon the expectations of other employees. . . is in no
way a function of the specific type of illegal discriminatory practice upon
which the judgment of liability is predicated. '2 14
The American legal system has historically shown a particularly strong
commitment to the notion of "no liability without fault. '21 5 Slowly, however,
the recognition developed that those engaged in certain abnormally dangerous
activities should be held strictly liable for the consequences of those activities
without regard to the question of blame.2 16 Similarly, the conclusion spread
that injuries arising out of workplace mishaps, the use of manufactured prod-
ucts, and other common accidents should be compensated through some sys-
tem other than tort litigation based on fault, which was failing both to
212. See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
213. Gunnar Myrdal observed many years ago that: "[T]o give white workers a monopoly on
all promotions is, of course, to give them a vested interest in job segregation." G. MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA 391-92 (1944), quoted in United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). Such vested interest is unaffected by
the methods or motives that lie behind the monopoly.
214. Franks, 424 U.S. at 764 n.21.
215. Nineteenth Century American tort law came to be dominated by fault notions. In the
leading case of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), plaintiff brought a trespass action
for assault and battery against defendant, who had raised a stick to separate two fighting dogs and
in the process accidentally struck plaintiff, who was standing behind him. Under traditional Eng-
lish law of trespass, plaintiff should have won without regard to defendant's blameworthiness.
The Massachesetts court, however, found for defendant, holding that liability in trespass required
either intentional or negligent wrongdoing. The decision was widely followed. American courts
in the 19th century generally rejected the English doctrine of strict liability for harm caused by
abnormally dangerous activities, represented by Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (L.R. 1868). In-
deed, the fault ethic was so powerful that the New York Court of Appeals in 1911 declared that
state's first workers' compensation statute unconstitutional because it imposed liability without
fault. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). See supra note 65.
216. The activities included in this category are those that are too socially necessary to pro-
hibit altogether, but nevertheless create unusual risks of harm. These include blasting, storing
dangerous substances, and keeping dangerous animals. See W. PROSSER, supra note 162, § 78;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1965).
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compensate victims and to encourage safety measures.217
The dissatisfaction with fault liability arose in part from the cost in time,
money, and resources that were being diverted into the adversary process on
fact issues which were at best difficult to prove.218 As noted above, the Griggs
theory of disparate impact discrimination seems premised on many of these
same concerns with regard to the enforcement of Title VII.21 9 Now, however,
in the critical area of perpetuation of past discrimination by seniority schemes,
we have a return to fault consciousness.
Many rationales have been advanced to justify basing tort liability on
fault.220 One is a moral basis-a defendant should pay for damages only if
they resulted from "blameworthy" conduct on his part. A second, suggested
by the economic theorists221 and traceable back to Learned Hand's famous
formula,222 is that liability should be imposed on the injurer only when it
would have been cheaper for him to avoid the accident by appropriate precau-
tions than to pay the accident's costs. The purpose served by this notion of
fault is to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis into a deterrence theory. Morton
Horwitz has written of yet another argument advanced in favor of fault-that
such liability-limiting doctrines are needed to prevent the law from being used
for the purpose of redistributing wealth and driving entrepreneurs out of
business.223
None of these justifications seems very persuasive support for the Swint
intent requirement. Regarding the moral question, a seniority challenge
presents us with an employer or union that has engaged in past discrimination
which is continuing to haunt minority employees. In view of the stakes for the
217. See generally J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1957) (products
liability); M. WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE (1974); Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An
Approach to NonFault Allocation, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lotter: Compensation and
Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967); Gilmore, Products Liability-A Commentary,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103 (1971); Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189
(1965); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1971).
218. As Professor Peck put it regarding one variety of fault cases, "[t]he problems of proof
involved in automobile accident litigation under a negligence standard are so great that it is only
blind optimism in a large number of cases to hope that what in fact occurred will become known."
Peck, supra note 217, at 241-42. Writing of the fault system of divorce, Professor Michael Wheeler
observed in 1974:
The fault system is inconsistent, expensive, and hypocritical. As serious as these short-
comings are, the system might be tolerable if it somehow contributed to family stability
in our society. But it does not. If anything it obscures the real issues in marital break-
down, and thus makes their solution all the more difficult. The fundamental weakness of
fault divorce is that it is predicated on the myth that the breakdown of a marriage can be
attributed solely to the wrongdoing of one spouse.
M. WHEELER, supra note 217, at 12.
219. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
220. See generally R. RABIN, supra note 65, at 1-81.
221. See, e.g., Posner, ,4 Theory of Negligence, supra note 65; Posner, Strict Liability: .4 Com-
ment, supra note 65.
222. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (duty of care is
function of three variables: probability of accident, gravity of resulting harm, and burden of ade-
quate precautions); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (same three factors).
223. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in POLITICS, supra note 176, at 202.
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minority victim and the innocent white worker, the moral blameworthiness of
third parties (employer and union) seems a poor measure by which to dis-
tribute the harm. Similarly, notions of cost-benefit deterrence seem inappro-
priate because it is really the innocent white employee, not the employer or
union, who will suffer the consequeices of diminished seniority expectations if
relief is granted, and it is questionable what such rank-and-file employees can
do to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination by their employer or
union. Finally, the fear of going "too far" to redress problems of discrimina-
tion would seem to suggest a limit on Title VII liability rationally based on
actual consequences, not subjectively based on motive.
It has been noted that "[d]eeply ingrained in human nature is the ten-
dency to distinguish intended results from accidental happenings. '224 In the
oft-quoted words of Justice Holmes, "even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked. ' 225 But as is clear now, the Swint standard
does not distinguish intended from accidental results. The disparate impact of
a seniority factor engrafted upon a system of past exclusionary practices is
utterly foreseeable, and by the time the plaintiff's case is filed seniority-based
decisionmaking has already been producing such impact. Regardless of actual
purpose, it cannot be said that the seniority system's effect on minorities is
"accidental."
The Swint standard wholly fails to recognize that subjective purpose is of
little significance in the reality of the workplace. Indeed, as one noted jurist
has observed in another context:
[W]e now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thought-
lessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the pub-
lic interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.226
224. R. PERKINS, supra note 180, at 739.
225. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
226. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), af'dsub nom. Smuck v. Hob-
son, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Judge J. Skelly Wright, sitting by designation).
Put another way:
Beyond consciously held attitudes, racist mentality may also display what Paul Brest
has descibed as "racially selective indifference." Similarly, Edgar and Jean Cain refer to
"racism by inadvertence" or "selective inattention." Such indifference is racist when it
effectively denies benefits to members of the subjugated group or imposes burdens on
them which would not be denied or imposed if they were white.
The above notions hint at why racism is often so hard to identify in any articulable
[sic) fashion. And yet today's racism is a living system, as much so as were slavery and
Jim Crow. The difference is that today's racism, systematic and highly tuned, inflicts a
greater proportion of its harms without trying, or thinking. Still, "[olne who is stumbled
over often enough may, understandably, notice that these cumulative impacts bear a
certain functional resemblance to kicks." It is this unthinking aspect of racism which
makes nonsensical the requirement in Washington v. Davis that racial discrimination be
proved by showing intent.
Racism, it becomes apparent, is not merely individualistic and attitudinal; it is also
collective. It is similar to negligence in that whites often exercise a lesser standard of care
in their attitudes toward and treatment of blacks than they exercise in regard to their
fellow whites. Much of this is because whites are socialized under the influence of insti-
tutional racism, which consists of those racist policies and practices that are built-in com-
ponents of the very structure and process of most American institutions, Often without
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This phenomenon of "unthinking" discrimination means, then, that at
least some seniority systems which are not truly neutral in their intent will
nevertheless pass muster under the Swint standard. Moreover, if we inquire
into the likely effect such a standard will have on the future conduct of the
actors in the workplace, it is fair to assume that a rule which absolves unions
and employers of any liability for a discriminatory-in-effect seniority system
unless there is persuasive evidence of wrongful motivation will fail to achieve
a major goal of Title VII-to provide the "spur or catalyst which causes em-
ployers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges" of
their discriminatory practices. 227
The fault standard reinforces one political view of discrimination: that it
is the work not of societal forces but of a few aberrant individuals acting on
their own. As Professor Chayes has noted:
The traditional conception of adjudication reflected the late 19th
Century vision of society, which assumed that the major social and
economic arrangements would result from the activities of autono-
mous individuals. In such a setting, the courts could be seen as an
adjunct to private ordering, whose primary function was a resolution
of disputes about the fair implication of individual interactions. The
basic conceptions governing legal liability were "intention" and
"fault."2 2 8
the intent of the people involved, institutional policies and practices serve the aims of
racism, excluding, disadvantaging, or stigmatizing blacks.
Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L.
Rcv. 201, 208-09 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See also Schnapper, supra note 56, at 40; Simon,
supra note 152, at 1060.
In a non-Title VII civil rights context, the Court recently has recognized the need to punish
conduct taken with "indifference to consequences" as well as that taken with "intent to cause
consequences." See Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1633 n.10 (1983) (punitive damages in § 1983
action).
227. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). It is axiomatic that "a
rational lawbreaker will discount the gravity of any legal sanction by the probability that it will be
imposed." Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 65, at 40-41 (citing Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968)). See also Ehrlich, The Deter-
rent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261 (1972).
Deterrence has consistently been emphasized by the Supreme Court as the primary goal of
Title VII. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93 (1981) (Title VII
is a "comprehensive [program] designed to eliminate certain varieties of employment discrimina-
tion."); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 595 (1981) (Title VII was designed as
a "means of eliminating employment discrimination."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 768 n.28 (1976) (speaking of the Act's "'primary objective' of eradicating discrimination");
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-18 (1975) (The "primary objective" of Title VII
is deterrence of discriminatory practices and the secondary objective is compensation to victims
"to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion."); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (The primary purpose of Title VII
is to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees."). But see Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) (indicating that the compensa-
tion purpose and the deterrent purpose are "equally important").
228. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); see
also Able, Torts, in POLITICS, supra note 176, at 185; Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causa-
tion, in POLITICS, supra note 176, at 202 (speaking of the role of causation: "The plaintiff in a tort
action should recover only because of an unlawful interference with his right, not because of any
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Thus, "[o]nce [the Court] has characterized a [public law] case as private the
Court can appeal to rules of private tort or contract law without having to
show that those rules are appropriate to the resolution of the public questions
contained in constitutional controversies." '229
Griggs represented the Court's recognition that discrimination is a perva-
sive problem whose dimensions are societal and whose causes are rooted in the
unique American experience. In disparate impact theory, individual guilt and
moral blame play no more role than they do in worker's compensation
schemes, which treat injury in the workplace not as a series of discrete events
caused by bad employers but rather as a problem inherent in industrial society
which requires a "macro" solution. Swint is a step backward, to a definition of
discrimination as a particular act directed toward particular victims and moti-
vated by a specific intent that can be neatly dissected into lawful and unlawful
components.230 As such, the Swint standard is consistent with other recent
developments in civil rights case law requiring proof of strict causation 231 and
adopting a significantly more restrictive view toward class certification of Title
VII cases. 232
It is clear beyond doubt that the Swint standard, requiring "after the fact
assessments of motive," 233 poses substantial problems of proof for litigants,
especially plaintiffs. The courts have not been unmindful of these
problems,234 and the search by the parties and triers of fact for the hidden
motivation behind disparate results is bound to increase what Professor Ep-
stein refers to as "the administrative costs of decision. ' 235  It has been
observed:
Overt and blatant discrimination is a relatively rare phenome-
non [in today's world]. The very existence of title VII, with its ban
more general public goals of the state. The idea of vindication of individual rights was intimately
connected with the notions of objective causation.").
229. Comment, Cases that Shock the Conscience: Reflections on Criticism ofthe Burger Court,
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 713, 740-41 (1980). See also Brodin, supra note 65.
230. The problem of mixed-motivation has been treated elsewhere. See Brodin, supra note 65.
231. See Brodin, supra note 65.
232. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
233. Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEao L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1978).
234. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("The intractable problems [of proving intent] involved in litigating this
issue are obvious to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived at subjectively by a court
endeavoring to ascertain the subjective intent of school activities. . . will be fortuitous, unpredict-
able and even capricous."); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981), aft'd, 102 S.
Ct. 3272 (1982) ("We think it can be stated unequivocally that, assuming an electoral system is
being maintained for the purpose of restricting minority access thereto, there will be no memoran-
dum between the defendants, or legislative history, in which it is said, 'We've got a good thing
going with this system; let's keep it this way so those Blacks won't get to participate.' Even those
who might otherwise be inclined to create such documentation have become sufficiently sensitive
to the pperation of our judicial system that they would not do so. Quite simply, there wil/ be no
'smoking gun.' "); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[lI]t is
difficult-and often futile-to obtain direct evidence of the official's intentions. Rather than an-
nounce his intention of violating antidiscrimination laws, it is far more likely that the state official
'will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and illusive-
for we deal with an area in which 'subtleties of conduct. . . play no small part.' ").
235. Epstein, supra note 65, at 188.
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on discrimination, and its provisions guaranteeing victims the right
to damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, has meant the elim-
ination of most such discrimination by most employers. It is inten-
tional discrimination in its covert, hidden form that now poses the
real problem. Evidence of illicit intent may be extremely difficult to
obtain, whether the responsible individuals are conscious of their
bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expres-
sing unconscious bias through some discretionary decisionmaking
process. 236
One aspect of the proof problem is the difficulty of ascertaining collective
intent.2 37 The adoption and maintenance of a seniority system generally in-
volves the participation of numerous individuals and groups-union officials,
corporate officers, negotiaters, rank-and-file workers. How many participants
must be shown to have been motivated by discriminatory purpose before the
seniority system falls under section 703(h)? Is it sufficient if two out of five
members of the union negotiating team can be shown to have had improper
motives, or must it be a majority? What if a majority of the team acted out of
mixed motives (e.g., a desire to keep black workers in segregated units and a
desire to reward length of service)?
A motive-centered standard for seniority challenges is also subject to criti-
cism for the effect it likely will have, both in and out of court, on the parties
and the litigation. One writer has noted in a related context:
[Flocusing on purposefulness tends to turn a lawsuit into a per-
sonal vendetta. Plaintiff cannot succeed showing that defendants' ac-
tions are wrong by demonstrating an objective discriminatory effect;
rather plaintiffs must show that defendants are bigots, and thus de-
fendants' actions are wrongful a fortiori. If the purpose of a lawsuit
is to open a dialogue between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the
dialogue will be furthered by focusing on objective criteria and not
upon that particular motivation which may have inspired the defend-
ant's conduct. . . . The recent Supreme Court decisions requiring
proof of discriminatory intent are more likely to promote dissension
than to draw people together.238
236. Bartholet, supra note 61, at 1202-03; see also Schnapper, supra note 56, at 49.
237. Cf. McGee v. South Pemiscot School Dist., 545 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1983). See generally
Brodin, supra note 65, at 321 n.120; Simon, supra note 135, at 1097, 1106.
238. Seng, The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg, 61 OR. L.
REv. 285, 314 n. 140 (1982). See also Brest, supra note 233, at 1147-48; Karst, The Costs of Motive-
CenteredInquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163 (1978); Miller, If "The Devil HimselfKnows Not the
Mind of Man,"How Can Judges Know the Motivation of Legislators?, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1167
(1978); Schnapper, supra note 56, at 31.
Professor Wheeler has observed in the matrimonial area:
The adversary nature of fault divorce can add to a me-against-you momentum
which is hard to stop.
Requiring one person to find fault with the other aggravates an already unhappy
situation and further diminishes whatever chance there might be of salvaging the
marriage.
M. WHEELER, supra note 217, at 13-14.
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Motive inquiry poisons the atmosphere of the labor dispute and turns the
litigation into a swearing contest, while the actual results of the employment
practice and the business justifications for it become lost in the battle. Such an
atmosphere is not conducive to nonlitigation solutions, such as an agreement
to shorten the work week rather than layoff employees.239 A finding by the
court of bad motive will alienate and embarrass the defendants, not making
for a productive or pleasant atmosphere in which to continue work. Moreover
judges may be more reluctant to rule for plaintiffs when doing so means char-
acterizing corporate or union officials as bigots.
The Swint standard shifts the concentration of all concerned from the al-
leged fact that minority or female employees are being unjustifiably stymied in
their efforts to advance or retain their jobs to the personal virtues or faults of
the defendants. The problem itself-the obstacle to employment opportuni-
ties-is relevant only insofar as it can be said to evidence defendants' hidden
motives.
Since motive analysis is so subjective, furthermore, a standard like Swint
is an invitation for judges to act, in the words of one scholar, as "an imperial
judiciary,"240 reading their own social and political views into the decision at
hand. As Professor Tribe has aptly observed, "[T]he problems of proof raised
by [an intent] test are treacherous at best, and the discretion it leaves the court
in actual cases is enormous."
'24 1
III. CONCLUSION
The question of how to balance the interests of victims of past discrimina-
tion against those of incumbent white workers with accrued seniority expecta-
tions is as difficult a question as is faced in fair employment law. It is the
premise of this Article that a more enlightened approach must be found than
the motive-centered Swint standard. The language and legislative history sur-
rounding section 703(h) leaves, it is submitted, room for such an approach;
Griggs provides its framework.
If, as several justices of the Court have suggested, section 703(h) is read as
a "grandfather clause" to protect only seniority expectations accruing prior to
the effective date of Title VII, then disparate impact theory would control
most present seniority cases as it does challenges to other employment prac-
tices. Judicial scrutiny would then focus on workplace reality, not mind-read-
ing. Griggs permits the employer to defend, not by resort to denial of bad
thoughts, but by a showing of actual business justification for the practice.
In defense of strict liability in tort, many have argued that '"/ caused B
harm" is sufficient justification for the imposition of liability notwithstanding
the level of blameworthiness that can be ascribed to the defendant. 242 Title
239. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1635-36; Note, supra note 8.
240. Miller, supra note 238, at 1170.
241. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-19 (1978).
242. Epstein, supra note 65, at 152.
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VII seniority cases should be afforded the same treatment, by application of
the Griggs principle, in order to further the lofty goals of the statute.2 43 But
even if some notion of fault is to be retained, it should at least be informed by
the non-motive based standards prevailing in most areas of tort and criminal
law. Motive inquiry adds little light, and much unwanted heat, to the debate
over seniority systems and equal employment opportunity.
243. As Eric Schnapper has so eloquently put it:
Elimination of new acts of discrimination against blacks, as against women and
other groups, will remain an important problem in the years ahead. But the central
discrimination issue of the 1980's will be to end the perpetuation of past discrimination.
If this goal is not accomplished, the speeches, judicial decisions, and legislation of the
past two decades may merely continue the string of broken promises of racial justice.
he federal courts, which sinceBrown have repeatedly demonstrated their determination
to eliminate intentional discrimination, must be equally vigilant and vigorous in ensur-
ing that the effects of that constitutionally condemned discrimination, and the practices
that perpetuate those effects, are also "eliminated root and branch."
Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 864 (1983).
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